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MUSCULAR PROCEDURE: CONDITIONAL DEFERENCE
IN THE EXECUTIVE DETENTION CASES
Joseph Landau*
Abstract: The executive detention cases of the past several years demonstrate a rare but
critical assertion of procedural law where the political branches fail to legislate or to properly
implement substantive law. This is "muscular procedure"-the invocation of a procedural
device to condition deference on political branch integrity. Courts have affected the law of
national security in profound ways by requiring the political branches to adhere to a
judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. Courts have resolved the merits
of individual enemy combatant challenges by rejecting executive branch decisions based on
absolute secrecy, innuendo, tentativeness, or multiple levels of hearsay, while affirming
executive determinations that satisfy minimal standards of reliability. More broadly, courts
have used procedural rules to smoke out and put in check Congress's lack of oversight of the
executive branch and the President's inadequate interpretation and implementation of
authorizing legislation. Although the prevailing descriptive and normative frameworks
advocate either blind deference to the collective expertise of the political branches or judicial
resolution of large, complex and highly fractious substantive questions, courts have instead
put procedure to muscular uses-focusing on the means of coordinate branch decisionmaking, while still allowing the political branches to define the content of the substantive
law. This theory of judicial review, which is grounded in the judiciary's comparatively
greater expertise in procedure, has implications beyond the national security context.
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INTRODUCTION
The executive detention cases of the past several years have prompted
renewed debate over the proper scope of judicial deference to the
executive branch's claimed need to limit individual liberties during
times of crisis. Some theorists argue that courts should resolve large
policy questions raised by individual challenges to assertions of
executive power.' Others believe that courts should decide as little as

1. See Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 235 (2006) ("fault[ingl" the Supreme Court "for doing less than it should have" in resolving
constitutional questions of individual liberty); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the
"War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1029, 1092 (2008) (noting that "the Supreme Court
has left the final, substantive outcome of the cases at bar uncertain" and that the decisions have
"resulted in a great deal of process, and not much justice"); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting
Guantdnamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2009)

Muscular Procedure
possible, asking only whether executive action is grounded within
statutory authority. 2 However, a number of the post-9/11 national
security decisions have accomplished a great deal without following
either approach. In these cases, the Supreme Court and a number of
lower courts have put procedural devices to surprisingly "muscular"
uses. The decisions illustrate a rare but critical assertion of procedural
law where the political branches fail to legislate or properly implement
substantive law. This is "muscular procedure"-the invocation of a
procedural rule to condition deference on coordinate branch integrity.
The cases provide a framework for understanding the role of judicial
review in the post-9/11 executive detention decisions, with implications
for other fields of law as well.3
Many commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's executive
detention decisions as "merely" procedural rulings, pointing out that the
Court has generally addressed itself to questions about adjective law or
the ground rules of litigation: whether the Court has jurisdiction;
whether detainees can access the courts; and whether the government is
required to provide discovery, and if so, how much. Far fewer decisions
have resolved substantive questions such as the scope of executive
(manuscript at 3, available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract.id=1268422)
("Indeed, the pronouncement [in Boumediene v. Bush] that a provision of the Constitution extended
to noncitizen wartime prisoners held outside of the sovereign United States was breathtaking,
particularly in the face of six years of government insistence that the prisoners at Guantdnamo had
no rights whatsoever, and could be held indefinitely, even for life, without charge or meaningful
opportunity to contest their treatment or detention. It was a rebuke to the Executive's claims of
outsize authority, and, the Court told us, a re-assertion of the supremacy of law. It was a rights
moment. Or so it seemed."); David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism
and GuantanamoBay, 2007-2008 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 47; cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. _,
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2293 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("So who has won? Not the detainees. The
Court's analysis leaves them with only the prospect of further litigation to determine the content of
their new habeas right, followed by further litigation to resolve their particular cases, followed by
further litigation before the D.C. Circuit .... ").
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 34 (2006) (arguing that during times of crisis, courts should "decid[e] cases narrowly,
preferably on statutory grounds, hesitating to trundle out the heavy artillery of constitutional
invalidation"); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50 (advancing "a
minimalist Uudicial] approach to intrusions on freedom amidst war"); see also Samuel Issacharoff
& Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianismand Executive Unilateralism:An Institutional
Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004) (making the
case that courts historically uphold executive decisions when grounded in congressional
authorization).
3. See infra Part V.B.
4. See infra note 29 and accompanying text; infra Part I.A.
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power and the content of individual liberty-that is, whom the Executive
can hold and for how long, and the specific constitutional protections
that apply. But regardless of whether a particular decision turns on
"process" or "substance"-an age-old distinction that resists clear
definition 5 -courts have affected the law of national security in
profound ways by explicitly requiring the political branches to adhere to
a judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. In
individual cases, rulings about seemingly mundane procedural issues
such as discovery and evidentiary standards have accelerated the release
of enemy combatant detainees who were held at Guantdnamo Bay years
after being cleared of any wrongdoing. 6 More broadly, procedural
devices have been used to smoke out and put in check Congress's lack
of oversight of the executive branch and its misguided interpretations
and implementation of authorizing legislation.7
In a number of these cases, courts have resolved the merits of an
enemy combatant 8 challenge by scrutinizing the Executive's adherence
5. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 192-224 (2004)
(summarizing debates over relationship between substance and procedure); see also JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS INTHE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 5 (1985) ("Although much ink has been
spilled by courts and commentators in the attempt to separate questions of substance and process,
the attempt can never be wholly successful because the questions are functionally inseparable.");
Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 85 ("[S]ubstance and
process are two aspects of the same phenomenon."); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: ProceduralSurrogatesfor Substantive ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1625, 1630 (1992) ("The distinction [between process and substance] has proved to be elusive (and
perhaps illusory) in the numerous areas of law in which it has acquired rhetorical significance. In
spite of its elusiveness, and no doubt partly because of it, the boundary between substance and
procedure remains a Holy Grail of legal analysis."); Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes:
SubstantiveDue Process, ProceduralDue Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833,
848 (2003) ("At the margin, at least, the distinction between substance and procedure blurs.").
6. See infra Parts II.A.I-A.2. The Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base was used as a facility to house
alien detainees. Yasir Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was originally held at Guant~namo but eventually
transferred to a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina, and later to Norfolk, Virginia, after it was
determined he was a U.S. citizen. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 25 (2006).

7. See infra Part H.B.
8. The term "enemy combatant," first used by the Bush Administration to describe certain terror
suspects held at GuantAnamo Bay and elsewhere after 9/11, was jettisoned by the Obama
Administration in March 2009. See William Glaberson, U.S. Won't Label Terror Suspects as
Combatants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at Al. But the Obama Administration claims authority to
detain virtually the same range of individuals as those included in the Bush Administration
definition. See Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 080442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (claiming the authority to detain not only persons who were "part of"
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to baseline procedural safeguards-rejecting determinations based on
absolute secrecy, innuendo, tentativeness, or multiple levels of hearsay,
while affirming executive branch decisions satisfying minimal standards
of reliability. 9 In the process, the judiciary has rebuffed the President's
extreme interpretations of vague authorizing legislation,'0 reexamined
inadequately reasoned decisions by various arms of the executive branch
in implementing a congressional delegation," and stimulated legislative
action where Congress has failed to oversee executive decision-making
through the legislative process.' 2 Throughout these decisions, procedure
functions as a corrective to decision-making by one (or both) of the
political branches that, if left undisturbed, would violate a judicially
imposed standard requiring lucid, intelligible procedures.
Sometimes judicial review is overtly exacting in these cases, with
courts imposing burdensome procedural obligations on a party to
litigation (usually the government).' 3 Other times the review is relatively
light-as in the imposition of a relaxed standard of review when ruling
on an enemy combatant designation-but heavy enough to invalidate
executive branch decisions lacking sufficient indicia of reliability.' 4 Still
other times the review is moderately demanding, requiring a co-equal
branch to reconsider its interpretation of a statute (in the case of the
Executive) 5 or to reaffirm its position through clear and more
purposeful language (in the case of the legislature).' 6 These varying
procedural demands are generally consistent with the deference norms
that obtain under prevailing doctrine, 17 but they impose enhanced
procedural conditions that require the political branches to satisfy a
judicially imposed level of transparency and deliberation-conditions

but also those that "substantially supported" the Taliban, al-Qaida, or other associated forces and
recognizing the ambiguousness of the phrase "substantially supported" and its potentially broad
application). For a discussion of the previous definition of "enemy combatant," see infra note 150.
9. See infra Part II.A.2.
10. See infra Part ll.B. 1.
11. See infra Part II.B.2.
12. See infra Part n.B.3.
13. See infra Part Hl.A.1.
14. See infra Part I.A.2.
15. See infra notes 149-52, 163-68 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part I.B.3.
17. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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that make procedural review far more muscular than might otherwise be
expected.
Muscular procedure highlights a process-oriented approach18 to legal
decision-making in national security through a judicial insistence on
procedural regularity, a matter over which the judiciary has a
comparative advantage in expertise. 19 The theory presents an alternative
to much of the conventional wisdom within the relevant literature.
Although the prevailing frameworks advocate either blind deference to
the collective expertise of the political branches or judicial resolution of
large, complex, and highly fractious substantive questions, courts have
put procedure to muscular uses by focusing on the means of coordinate
branch decision-making, while still allowing the political branches to
define the content of the substantive law. The cases discussed in this
article, by integrating baseline procedural standards into cases of interbranch importance, present new ways of thinking about the relationship
between judicial decision-making and procedural values such as
transparency and deliberation, with implications beyond the national
security context.2 °
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I reviews the debate within
the post-9/1 1 literature regarding the proper judicial role in resolving the
tension between individual liberty and the President's claimed security
needs. Some scholars advance the view that procedural devices merely
delay resolutions and that courts should decide an array of substantive
policy questions, while others argue for the virtual elimination of
judicial review where Congress and the President agree on a particular
policy pronouncement. The balance of this Article seeks to challenge
these conceptions of judicial review, both descriptively and normatively.
18. The legal process school of thought was first advanced during the 1940s and 1950s by
commentators who emphasized the "relative institutional competence of courts, legislatures and
agencies to make and implement social policy decisions." Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separationof Powers and the Requirement of Adequate

Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 407. Legal process scholars tend to stress the
judiciary's relative advantage in deciding procedural matters and comparative disadvantage in
deciding questions of substantive policy decisions, about which the democratically elected branches
have greater expertise. See id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical
and Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li (William N.

Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Richard H. FaUon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and
Wechsler Paradigm,47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 972-76 (1994).
19. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part N.B.

Muscular Procedure
Part II develops a framework of muscular procedure by exploring
decisions that condition judicial deference on the Executive's adherence
to a judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. Within
that framework, procedure can perform different functions. In individual
cases, courts can invoke procedural devices to precipitate detainee
releases, 21 guide merits determinations, 22 halt the return of detainees to
countries where they fear torture,23 and endorse efforts by litigants to
invoke additional procedural rules in aid of their respective claims or
defenses.24 More broadly, courts can use procedural rulings to reject
decision-making by the coordinate branches that lacks professional
judgment-including occasions when the President overreaches in
interpreting a statutory mandate,2 5 when various arms of the executive
branch fail to manage their own internal processes of review, 26 or when
Congress abdicates its responsibility to oversee executive branch
decision-making through clear legislation.27 The cases demonstrate how
judicial decisions about procedural rules can have a far greater effect on
the substantive law than many commentators have recognized.
Part III moves to a normative discussion by demonstrating how the
framework of muscular procedure sheds light on the leading scholarly
positions regarding the proper judicial role in resolving the conflict
between liberty and security. That scholarship generally treats
procedural resolutions as inferior substitutes for substantive decisions or
presents an overly formal or idealized account of procedure's
appropriate role. Muscular procedure, by contrast, demonstrates how a
process-oriented approach to decision-making in the national security
context can have the type of concrete effects on the law championed by
civil libertarian scholars, without treading into purely substantive areas
of law generally seen as the province of the political branches.
Part IV extends that normative discussion by considering the value of
procedural decisions in the national security context, contrasting the
specific function of muscular procedure with other procedural devices

21. See infra note 69 and accompanying text; infra Part H.A. 1.
22. See infra Part H.A.2.
23. See infra Part H.A.3.
24. See infra Part H.A.4.
25. See infra Part II.B.1.
26. See infra Part fl.B.2.
27. See infra Part ll.B.3.
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that, when applied within immigration law, also express the judiciary's
commitment to deeper rule-of-law values. Within these different legal
frameworks, courts use transparency and deliberation requirements to
insist on an enhanced procedural regularity in political branch decisionmaking, without rejecting outright political branch expertise on
substance. This process-based approach clarifies the role of the judiciary
based on its comparatively greater expertise in procedure.
I.

CRITICISM OF THE 9/11 DECISIONS AS MERE PROCEDURE

While some commentators have hailed the Supreme Court's executive
detention cases as watersheds,2 8 others see them "less like landmarks and
more like small signposts directing the traveler to continue toward an
eventual, more significant fork in the road. 29 In some ways, each
critique hits its mark. But, landmarks or not, the cases demonstrate a
form of procedural review that has surprisingly muscular implications.
To understand how, it is useful first to recap briefly the Supreme Court
holdings and subsequent criticism.
A.

The Supreme Court's Decisionsfrom Rasul to Boumediene

In 2004, the Court issued three major decisions regarding executive
detention. Rasul v. Bush 30 held that alien detainees at Guantdnamo could
invoke the federal habeas corpus statute to challenge their confinement,
but offered nothing (save a cryptic footnote) 31 about the scope of their
constitutional rights in habeas.32 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,33 the Court
28. See Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, at

18, 18 (calling Boumediene "one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in recent years"
and "a landmark change in our constitutional practice"); see also Emily Calhoun, The Accounting:
Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 78 (2008) ("From Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld to Rasul v. Bush to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court has protected individuals'
access to federal courts to challenge the constitutionality of unilateral executive detention. This
access has justifiably been celebrated by advocates for alleged enemy combatants.").
29. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1029; see generally supra note 1.
30. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
31. Id. at 483 n. 15 ("Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat
nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for
more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoingunquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006))).
32. Id. at 485 ("Whether and what further proceedings may become necessary after respondents

Muscular Procedure
determined that the President could detain a U.S. citizen enemy
combatant but had to provide him with a due process hearing before a
neutral decision-maker. 34 The Court provided little detail regarding the
contours of that hearing, which was left in the hands of the executive
branch.35 In Padilla v. Rumsfeld,36 the Court held that a U.S. citizen
37
enemy combatant had filed his petition in the wrong judicial district.
The Court did not make an inquiry into the legality of Padilla's
detention; it merely resolved a jurisdictional question, requiring Padilla
to lodge a fresh petition in a different federal court.38
In 2006, the Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 39 that the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which applies to an armed conflict with a foreign terrorist
organization, did not authorize the Guantdnamo military commissions.4n
However, the Court's ruling implied that Congress could reauthorize the

make their response to the merits of petitioners' claims are matters that we need not address now.
What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the
legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly
innocent of wrongdoing."); see Fiss, supra note 1,at 245-46 ("Although the Rasul Court ruled that
the prisoners had a right to file a habeas application in a federal district court and to require a
response by the government, it did not specify what further rights-procedural or substantive-they
had before that court. Even more significantly, the Court grounded the limited right it did provide in
the federal habeas statute, not the Constitution, and left uncertain whether the prisoners had any
constitutional rights that might be vindicated in the habeas proceeding it allowed. The Court simply
granted the prisoners the fight to file a piece of paper.").
33. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
34. Id. at 509.
35. See Martinez, supra note 1,at 1048 ("[The Court] left a great deal undecided. For example,
[it] did not specify in any detail what procedures should be used in the hearing on remand. Could
Hamdi call witnesses? Would the government be required to produce witnesses if Hamdi wanted to
cross examine them? Would the government be required to provide other forms of discovery to
Hamdi? Who would have the burden of proof, and what would that burden be?"). Also left
unaddressed in Hamdi was the range of individuals that the Executive could hold as enemy
combatants, which the Court explicitly left to "be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases
are presented to them." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.L
36. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
37. Id. at 442, 451.
38. Id. at 446, 451; see Martinez, supra note 1,at 1038 ("From a normative perspective, the
Padilla case is troubling.... [T]he practical effect... was to enable the government to keep Padilla
isolated and subject to coercive interrogation for twenty-one months, and to keep him in military
custody for a total of forty-three months on uncertain legal grounds.").
39. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
40. Id. at 624-33.
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Executive's favored commissions through a statute,4 and Congress
followed suit by enacting the Military Commissions Act (MCA).42 In
2008, the Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush43 that constitutional habeas
protections applied at Guantdnamo Bay, restoring the detainees' access
to the Great Writ to challenge their confinement. 44 Boumediene also
invalidated jurisdiction-stripping legislation, ruled that a congressional
act violated the Constitution's Suspension Clause, and found that a
policy created by the legislative and executive branches exceeded their
collective constitutional authority. 45 However, the Court explicitly left
untouched "the content of the law that governs petitioners' detention. ' ' 6
Boumediene, like the four previous executive detention cases to come
before the Court, decided threshold issues of law while deliberately
leaving unresolved a host of additional questions.47

41. As Justice Breyer noted in his Hamdan concurrence, "[n]othing prevents the President from
returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes is necessary." 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); id. at 637 ("If Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the
controlling statutes, in conformance with the Constitution and other laws, it has the power and
prerogative to do so."); see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 1029-30 ("In its decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld . . .the Supreme Court minimized the impact of its decision on national security by
referring in an almost offhand way to the possibility that Congress could simply change the rules to
allow military commissions.").
42. Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
43. 553 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
44. Id. at 2262 ("We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl.
2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo
Bay.").
45. See Gerald L. Neuman, The ExtraterritorialConstitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 259, 260-61 (2009) ("[F]or the first time in history the Court found it necessary to
strike down a statute as violating the Suspension Clause, rather than construe it to avoid
invalidity."); see also Cole, supra note 1, at 47-48 ("First, for the first time in its history, the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law enacted by Congress and signed by the president on
an issue of military policy in a time of armed conflict .... Second, and also for the first time, the
Court extended constitutional protections to noncitizens outside U.S. territory during
wartime ....Third, the Court declared unconstitutional a law restricting federal court
jurisdiction.").
46. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2277. The Court called it "a matter yet to be determined." Id.
47. See Cole, supra note I, at 56 ("[Boumediene] leaves government officials guessing as to
which, if any, constitutional constraints will apply to official action abroad, and gives the Court a
relatively free hand in future cases."); Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention Of
Terrorists:Why Detain, And Detain Whom?, 3 J. OF NAT'L SEc. L. & POL. 1, 2 (forthcoming 2009)
("'he [Boumediene] Court expressly left unresolved important substantive questions such as the
scope of the Executive's power to detain, and delegated to lower courts resolution of the procedural
issues likely to arise in hundreds of resulting habeas petitions.").

Muscular Procedure
B.

Scholarly Criticism of the Court's ProceduralDecisions

Civil libertarianism and "bilateral endorsement ''48 represent the two
leading theories that have emerged in light of the Court's decisions.
While both conceptions of judicial review advance at least some role for
the courts in deciding questions of national security--only a third
position, executive unilateralism, rejects judicial review entirely 9-they
take very different approaches to the issue of how courts should decide
the substance of the liberty/security debate.
Civil libertarians argue that courts should decide substantive claims,
and they tend to criticize the five recent Supreme Court decisions for
leaving unresolved questions such as the proper definition of the term
"enemy combatant," the presumptive period that such individuals can be
50
held without formal charge, and the scope of their constitutional rights.
Jenny Martinez argues, for example, that the pre-Boumediene decisions
have "resulted in a great deal of process, and not much justice.' Owing
to the procedural nature of many of the post-9/1 1 decisions, "so little
seems to have been decided" 52 because the Court "left the final,
substantive outcome of the cases at bar uncertain. 5 3 Muneer Ahmad
48. Issacharoff and Pildes use "bilateral endorsement" generally to advance a descriptive project.
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 27, 33, 35. Posner and Sunstein champion bilateral
endorsement (or something very similar to it) on normative grounds as the ideal role for the courts
in times of crisis. See Posner, supra note 2, at 34; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 50.
49. Executive unilateralists reject almost any role for judicial review of executive branch
decisions on matters of national security, arguing that courts should yield entirely to the political
branches, which are more ably equipped to manage questions of individual liberty during times of
crisis. For a description of the executive unilateralist position, see, for example, Issacharoff &
Pildes, supra note 2, at 4. Issacharoff and Pildes characterize executive unilateralists as "advocates
of national security" who, "[r]easoning from the correct starting point that these contexts necessitate
a greater degree of the distinct qualities the executive branch tends to possess . . . conclude that
unilateral executive discretion, not subject to oversight from other institutions, is required." Id. The
Supreme Court has resoundingly rejected that approach, and it will not be considered at great length
here. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
50. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 245-46; id. at 256 ("What is missing from this calculus, and in my
judgment from all three of these much celebrated cases [Rasul, Hamdi and Padilla] . . . is a full
appreciation of the value of the Constitution-as a statement of the ideals of the nation and as the
basis of the principle of freedom-and even more, a full appreciation of the fact that the wholehearted pursuit of any ideal requires sacrifices, sometimes quite substantial ones."); Martinez, supra
note 1, at 1028 ("Each of these decisions [Rasul, Hamdi, Padilla, Hamdan] focused primarily on
issues of process, while more substantive questions were left lurking in the background.").
51. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1092.
52. Id. at 1032.
53. Id. at 1029.
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argues that "[w]hile commentators can point to an unbroken record of
legal victories" from Rasul through Boumediene, "the view from the
prisoners' perspective is quite different, and throws into question the
claim of transformative legal practice that the Court cases might
otherwise suggest. 54
Bilateral endorsement, by contrast, takes a "process-based,
institutionally-oriented (as opposed to rights-oriented) [approach to] ...
examining the legality of governmental action in extreme security
contexts. 55 Its adherents argue that judicial intervention is unnecessary
and inappropriate where the executive and legislative branches agree on
a common course of action.5 6 This "minimalist approach to intrusions on
freedom amidst war ' 57 defers to the greater institutional capability of the
political branches to decide national security policy given the "different
democratic pedigrees, different incentives, and different interests to
which they respond., 58 Bilateral endorsement tends to reinforce the
framework advanced by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,59 according to which courts
review executive action for coordinated efforts between the legislative
and executive branches.6 °
54. Ahmad, supra note 1, at 4.
55. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 5.
56. Id. at 8 (noting the "role of Congress as a partner in the determination of the nature and scope
of national emergency"). Cass Sunstein, moreover, emphasizes the role of Congress as an important
actor in responding to national security crises and an institution capable of providing "a check on
unjustified intrusions on liberty" during times of crisis. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 54.
57. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 50. Under a minimalist jurisprudence, judges decide no more than
necessary to resolve the case athand by avoiding any resolution of questions that could create, or
complicate, other cases. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Minimalism is often discussed within the context of Alexander
Bickel's "passive virtues," according to which courts decide questions of procedure and jurisdiction
before turning to merits adjudications. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 TermForeword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961).
58. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 5; see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (noting broad deference to
the executive branch based on its foreign policy expertise).
59. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
60. See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson draws an inverse relationship between
judicial review and legislative endorsement, arguing that executive acts based on an express
congressional grant are entitled "the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation," while executive action lacking congressional backing will be "scrutinized with
caution." Id. at 637-38. In the "absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority," the
President acts within a "zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority,
or in which its distribution is uncertain." Id. at 637. Sunstein argues that Jackson's model "captures
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C.

The Effect of ProceduralDecisions on Detainee Releases

Civil libertarian critics, some of whom write from the detainees'
perspectives, 6' note that procedural decisions often create uncertainty in
the law and delay final resolutions. 62 They observe that procedure can
prolong the confinement of detainees who may be innocent. 63 But the
data on Guantdinamo releases sheds a different light on that analysis.
Very few detainees released from Guantdinamo have been transferred
after a judicial order resolving the merits64 of a case: only eleven of the
thirty detainees who have been ordered released at the conclusion of 66a
full merits hearing 65 have been transferred from Guantdnamo.

the practices of the American courts when national security is threatened." Sunstein, supranote 2, at
50-51; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson's Wartime
Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of "Enemy Combatants," 68 ALA. L. REV. 1127, 1128
(2005) ("Justice Jackson's concurrence... established the starting framework for analyzing all
future foreign relations and individual liberties problems."); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 5
(noting that in times of crisis courts have deferred to executive decisions couched within
congressional authorization and that "[clontrary to the modem civil libertarian stance, the American
courts have only rarely addressed these issues through the framework of individual constitutional
rights"); cf. Adrian Vermeule, Holmes On Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 175 (2008) ("[T]he
passive virtues ...[and] ... judicial minimalism... are sometimes

said to apply even more

strongly during emergencies; on this view the higher stakes of emergency decisions, the
inflammation of public passions, and the possibility of setting bad precedents under the pressure of
extraordinary circumstances all counsel courts to keep a low profile until the emergency has
passed.").
61. See Ahmad, supra note 1,at 4; supra text accompanying note 54; see also infra notes 62-63
and accompanying text.
62. Martinez, for example, argues that "substantive and procedural law may be left in a more
uncertain state as a result" of the Court's post-9/1 1 decisions. Martinez, supranote 1,at 1091.
63. See id. at 1031 ("The prevalence of procedural rulings in the 'war on terror' cases thus has
significant implications for substantive rights in at least two ways. First, by delaying ultimate
resolution of rights claims, it has allowed serious violations of human rights to continue for years.
Second, this approach has foreclosed many rights-based challenges without actually considering the
merits of those challenges."); id. at 1017 ("[Tlhe focus on process rather than substance comes at a
human cost."); see also Ahmad, supra note 1, at 4; supra text accompanying note 54.
64. It should be noted that a favorable decision on the merits is not necessarily exoneration. Thus,
a ruling by a district court that a detainee must be released because he is improperly held as an
enemy combatant does not necessarily revoke the original enemy combatant label.
65. Al Rabiah v. U.S., No. 02-828, 2009, WL 3083077, at *27 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2009) (KollarKotelly, J.), ordered the release of Fouad Mahmoud Al Rabiah. Al Rabiah remains at Guantanamo.
Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, 2009 WL 2584685, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (Kessler, J),
ordered the release of Mohammed AI-Adahi. AI-Adahi remains at Guantanamo. Bacha v. Obama,
No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2365846, at * I (D.D.C. July 30, 2009) (Huvelle, J.), ordered the release of
Mohammed Jawad. Jawad was returned to his native Afghanistan on August 24, 2009. Al Mutairiv.
U.S., No. 02-828, 2009 WL 2364173, at *15 (D.D.C. July 29, 2009) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), ordered the
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Moreover, many of the 552 releases 67 so far have occurred after a
procedural ruling.68 Hamdi exemplifies this latter point: shortly after the
Court required the executive branch to provide Hamdi a due process
hearing, the government chose to release him. 69 Although Hamdi was
denied any opportunity to disprove his enemy combatant status,70 he was

release of Khalid Abdullah Mishal Al Mutairi. He was transferred to Kuwait on Oct. 13, 2009. Al
Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. June 22, 2009) (Leon, J.), ordered the release of
Abdulrahim Abdul Razak al Ginco (the name can also be spelled "Janko"). Al Ginco remains
imprisoned at GuantAnamo. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. May 11, 2009),
ordered the release of Alla Ali Bin Ali Ahmed. Ahmed remains imprisoned at GuantAnamo.
Basardh v. Bush, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2009) (Huvelle, J.), ordered the release of
Yasin Muhammed Basardh. Basardh remains imprisoned at GuantAnamo. El Gharani v. Bush, 593
F. Supp. 2d 144, 149 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009) (Leon, J.), ordered the release of Mohammed El
Gharani. El Gharani was released to Chad on June 11, 2009. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d
191, 198-99 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008) (Leon, J.), ordered that Lakhdar Boumediene, Mohamed
Nechla, Hadj Boudella, Ait Idir, and Saber Lahmar be released. Boumediene was released on May
15, 2009 to France. Nechla, Boudella, and Idir were released to Bosnia and Herzegovina on
December 16, 2008. Lahmar remains imprisoned at Guantdnamo. In re GuantanamoBay Detainee
Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2008), ordered the release of seventeen Uighur
detainees. The D.C. Circuit reversed that opinion, and the Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3577
(U.S. Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-1234). On June 11, 2009, four of these seventeen-Abdul Nassir,
Huzaifa Parhat, Jalal Jalaldin, and Abdul Semet-were released and transferred to Bermuda.
For release information concerning all of the Guantd.namo detainees discussed in this footnote,
see The Guantdnamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?scp=4&
sq=guantanamo&st=cse (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
66. This is because, in many cases, the government simply ignores a judicial order directing the
release of a detainee-despite a stated desire to comply with those orders and the larger goal of
closing the Guantinamo facility. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on
National Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office
Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ ("The courts have spoken. They have
found that there's no legitimate reason to hold 21 of the people currently held at Guantanamo ....I
cannot ignore these rulings because as President, I too am bound by the law. The United States is a
nation of laws and so we must abide by these rulings.").
67. As of October 20, 2009, 221 detainees remained in custody (six have died while imprisoned
at GuantAnamo). See The Guantdnamo Docket, supra note 65.
68. See infra note 69 and accompanying text; infra Part i.A. 1.
69. Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia: U.S. Citizen's Detention as Enemy
Combatant Sparked Fierce Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2.
70. See Peter Irons, "The Constitution Is Just a Scrap of Paper":Empire Versus Democracy, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1097 (2005) ("In September 2004, bowing to the Supreme Court's ruling, the
Bush administration grudgingly released Hamdi from the Navy brig ....Whether he was innocent
of any terrorist acts, of course, was a question the Bush administration refused to permit a court to
decide."); see also Emily Calhoun, The Accounting: Habeas Corpusand Enemy Combatants, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 77, 104 (2008) ("[Hamdi's] release suggests the executive was more worried about a
public accounting than about the fate of Hamdi as an individual.").
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spared the near-certainty of remaining in detention throughout trial and a
likely period of extended confinement during a protracted appellate
process.
While advocates claim that the rule of law will be better served
through decisions resolving substantive legal questions, there is no
guarantee that substantive rulings would redound to the benefit of the
causes they champion. Moreover, procedural rulings have provided
critical remedies in contexts where substantive law is generally
unavailing, as for instance where detainees have sought judicial
protection against torture overseas. 7 ' It would not be a stretch therefore
to argue that many of the detainees-if they could choose-might be
better off with a procedural resolution than a decision of substance.72
Beyond the debate about the relative merits and deficiencies of
"procedural" versus "substantive" decisions lies a deeper point about the
role of certain procedural values in precisely the types of complex and
highly charged scenarios raised within the executive detention context.
Where courts have placed a premium on coordinate branch adherence to
procedural ideas such as deliberation, transparency, and accountability,
judicial decisions have had a forceful effect on the individual cases and
the law more generally. By invoking these procedural devices, courts
have brought hundreds of cases to effective resolution. In other cases,
courts have rebuffed extreme interpretations of statutes by the Executive,
rejected decision-making by various arms of the executive branch that
inadequately implemented a congressional delegation, and provided
executive oversight where Congress failed to do so. This is muscular
procedure, which provides opportunities for thinking about how
procedure can affect the law-and substantive rights-in new and
unexplored ways.
II.

FROM MERE PROCEDURE TO MUSCULAR PROCEDURE

In a number of executive detention cases, the Supreme Court and
lower courts have expressed a willingness to bend to the executive
71. See infra Part II.A.3.
72. One could even argue that from a detainee's perspective, procedural victories are preferable
to a decision on the merits: procedural controversies carry less risk (given the possibility of an
adverse decision on the merits) and in some cases can lead to a favorable outcome more quickly
than litigation addressing substantive claims. From the government's perspective, this outcome
could be preferable, too, because it avoids the potentiality of a substantive decision invalidating its
preferred detention policy.
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branch's claimed security need, but only on condition that baseline
procedural standards are satisfied. This conditional deference norm is
manifested more narrowly when courts require the government to supply
clearer and more specific evidence to sustain a determination regarding
an individual detainee. Its broad manifestation occurs when courts
require greater transparency or deliberation by one or both of the
coordinate branches, regardless of their apparent agreement on a
particular policy issue, to protect the integrity of a decision-making
process that affects large numbers of individuals. Whether narrow or
broad, muscular procedure ensures meaningful judicial review in
individual cases while sharpening the judiciary's institutional role in
placing checks on coordinate branch overreach.
A.

How ProceduralRules Bring Cases to Resolution

Courts have invoked procedural devices to accelerate final resolutions
in large numbers of cases. In some cases, courts have imposed onerous
discovery burdens on the government, refusing to allow it to assert
without evidence the dangerousness of a particular detainee. In other
cases, courts have resolved a merits determination regarding the
propriety or impropriety of detention by imposing relatively mild
procedural burdens on the government, while refusing to budge on core
issues of procedural regularity. Courts have also used procedural rulings
to block executive action, including the transfer of detainees to third
countries where they could face torture, even though the substantive law
appeared to prevent that outcome. Finally, courts have endorsed efforts
by litigants to invoke additional procedural devices to secure vital
exculpatory material and other information relevant to their various
claims and defenses.
1.

Courts Have Accelerated FinalResolutions by Issuing Broad
Discovery Orders

In Bismullah v. Gates,7 3 the D.C. Circuit imposed stiff discovery
demands on the government in cases brought by enemy combatants
challenging their confinement at Guantinamo.74 The court held that the
government would have to supply not only the records compiled by the
73. 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
74. Id. at 180.
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Guantdnamo tribunals, which did not include the full array of
information from the government's files, but the entire body of
information within the government's possession on each detainee. 7
Bismullah established the scope of the record the D.C. Circuit would
require for all Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) petitions, and thus the
decision had broad application.7 6 In the DTA, Congress attempted to
eliminate federal jurisdiction over Guantdnamo and create an alternate
process consisting of a hearing before a Guantdnamo Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT) and a limited federal appeal before the D.C.
Circuit.77

The CSRT standards and procedures 78 contained a requirement that
the tribunals obtain all "reasonably available information in the
possession of the U.S. government bearing on the issue of whether the
' 79
detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant.
This included ordering the appearance of witnesses, including U.S.
military personnel, when "reasonably available," and ordering all
relevant agency files, their "acceptable substitute [s]," or a certification
that the requested information, if withheld, would not undermine an
enemy combatant determination. 80 But it became apparent during the

75. Id. at 184-86, 192.
76. Id. at 191.
77. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) amended the general habeas statute (currently codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)) to require that "no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider ... an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the Department of Defense at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba ..." DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148 § 1005(e),
119 Stat. 2739, 2741-42 (2005). In the DTA, Congress sought to supplant habeas with an
institutional process at Guantdnamo coupled with limited federal review by the D.C. Circuit on only
two matters: first, whether the Pentagon's tribunal "was consistent with the standards and
procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including
the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence
and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence)," id. §
1005(e)(2)(C)(i); and second, "to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination [was]
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States," id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii).
78. Standards and practices for those tribunals, including evidence-gathering and other
requirements, were set forth in two separate memos. See Memorandum from Gordon England,
Sec'y of the Navy (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.iVnews/Jul2004/
d20040730comb.pdf [hereinafter England Memorandum]; Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz,
Deputy Sec'y of Def., for the Sec'y of the Navy, (July 7, 2004), available at http://
www.defenselink.millnews/Jul2004/d2004O7O7review.pdf.
79. England Memorandum, supra note 78, at Enclosure 1 § E(3).
80. Id. at Enclosure 1 §§ l(E)(2), l(E)(3)(a).
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Bismullah litigation that the government had not followed its own
procedures: tribunals were unable to verify that they had examined all
the relevant, available information; agencies routinely denied requests
for confirmation by Guantlinamo personnel that the agency had no
exculpatory information on a particular detainee; and exculpatory
evidence was withheld from tribunals if it was believed to be
"duplicative" or "not relat[ing] to a specific allegation being made
against the detainee.",8' Bismullah, by mandating strict adherence to the
CSRT procedures, required the government to retrieve anew and
produce all relevant material, exculpatory and otherwise, with respect to
each detainee.
Although Bismullah merely required the government to do what it had
promised to do, the decision put the government in a severely weakened
and defensive position. Because the government had not kept intact the
full range of information, it argued that it would not be able to comply
with the discovery order, that it lacked the resources, and that it could
not go back and retrieve information that may have been initially
available but was not provided to a given tribunal.83 This emboldened
counsel for the detainees to seek compromises with the government even
while most substantive (and many procedural) questions surrounding
Guantdnamo remained unresolved. Since, by the time of the decision,
many of the detainees had been cleared for release and deemed not to
pose a threat to the United States,84 the discovery obligations put the
government in a situation where its best option may have been to pursue
transfer and resettlement, not additional litigation. While correlation is at
81. Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Decl. of James M.
McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy
4-6, 10-13 (May 31, 2007)).
82. Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 180 (2007) ("In order to review a Tribunal's determination
that, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, a detainee is an enemy combatant, the court must
have access to all the information available to the Tribunal.").
83. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Pentagon considered taking
an option it was given by the D.C. Circuit to reconvene new hearings, as opposed to turning over the
required information from the hundreds of hearings previously conducted. See William Glaberson,
New Detention Hearings May Be Considered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/14/usl4cnd-gitmo.html. The government did not ultimately exercise that option.
84. Farah Stockman, Some Cleared Guantanamo Inmates Stay in Custody-Lawyers call U.S.
System of Hearings a Sham, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2007, at Al ("About a quarter of detainees
who were cleared to leave Guantanamo Bay prison after hearings in 2005 and 2006 remain in
custody ....
").One well-known case involved seventeen Uighur detainees from China, whom the
government acknowledged pose no national security threat. See infra notes 89-95 and
accompanying text.
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best a crude proxy for causation, it is worth noting that during the fivemonth period following the D.C. Circuit's Bismullah decision, eightyfour detainees were released.85
The government fought tooth and nail to overturn Bismullah,8 6 and it
indirectly accomplished that mission roughly eighteen months later by
persuading the D.C. Circuit to relinquish jurisdiction over all DTA
petitions and to require the detainees to initiate habeas petitions in light
of the jurisdiction restored by Boumediene.8 7 Within habeas, the
government re-litigated the discovery issues and greatly reduced its
production burdens.88 Even though Bismullah no longer formally
governs the discovery obligations at Guant6.namo, it is a significant
example of how the courts employed procedural decisions to precipitate
out-of-court resolutions in individual cases. These procedural holdings,
85. See The Guantdnamo Docket, Timeline, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo/timeline. Bismullah was decided on July 20, 2007. The figures cited above represent
the number of releases from August 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007.
86. The government sought rehearing (and rehearing en banc) of the panel ruling. Rehearing was
denied, Bismullah, 503 F.3d at 140, and the full court denied rehearing en banc, Bismullah v. Gates,
514 F.3d 1291, 1293 (2008). Next, the government tried for a stay of the decision while it petitioned
for certiorari. The panel stayed the government's discovery obligation to produce additional record
material while the case was on appeal. Bismullah v. Gates, No. 06-1197, Order at 3-4 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 13, 2008). It reinstated its decision establishing procedures for DTA review after Boumediene.
Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
87. The government successfully argued that the D.C. Circuit's limited jurisdictional mandate
under the DTA did not survive Boumediene, and the court held that detainees could proceed
thereafter only through habeas. Bismullah, 551 F.3d at 1072-73, 1075. By convincing the D.C.
Circuit to nullify jurisdiction over the DTA in its entirety, the government obtained a pass from
Bismullah's discovery obligation, something it had been unable to accomplish through a direct
challenge of the discovery ruling itself.
88. By all accounts, the government has fared significantly better in habeas than it had under the
DTA, prevailing on most of the key procedural matters governing those proceedings (involving 113
cases and more than 200 detainees). The procedural motions for the cases have been coordinated
before Senior District Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Judge Hogan's November 6, 2008 Case
Management Order sets forth a framework for district judges conducting habeas trials after
Boumediene (though they are not obligated to follow it), and the Order's discovery obligations are
fewer than Bismullah's. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, Case
Management Order at 3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008). Under the Case Management Order, "[i]f requested
by the petitioner, the government shall disclose to the petitioner: (1) any documents or objects in its
possession that are referenced in the factual return; (2) all statements, in whatever form, made or
adopted by the petitioner that relate to the information contained in the factual return; and (3)
information about the circumstances in which such statements of the petitioner were made or
adopted." Id. The government also has to provide the "petitioner all reasonably available evidence
in its possession that tends materially to undermine the information presented to support the
government's justification for detaining the petitioner." Id. at 2. This discovery obligation is
narrower and less burdensome than what Bismullah required.
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while less likely to provoke criticism of outright judicial supremacy,
placed a condition on the DTA that prevented the government from
using it as a bulwark against meaningful judicial review.
2.

' Courts Have Resolved the Merits by Applying Baseline Evidentiary
Requirements

In Parhatv. Gates,89 the D.C. Circuit invalidated an enemy combatant
designation, a decision that applied to sixteen similarly situated
detainees. 90 Parhat focused on the underlying reliability of the
government's evidence, which the court refused to credit, even under a
relatively light standard of review. 9' The court left undecided a number
of substantive questions, including whether the Executive had the
authority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 92 to
detain individuals such as Parhat, who was held based on supposed
"affiliations" with an ethnic Uighur independence organization believed
to have al-Qaida and Taliban "associations. 93 The court found it
unnecessary to reach the government's statutory and constitutional
arguments because of its deeper concern with the CSRT panel's reliance
94
on statements lacking source information or other indicia of reliability.
The court held:
89. 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
90. Id. at 850. After the government lost the Parhatlitigation, it filed a motion proposing to treat
sixteen similarly situated detainees in exactly the same way, essentially conceding that it had no
case against them (or, at least, that it did not want to litigate those cases any further). In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-CV-442, Notice of Status (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2008). The
detainees moved for an order compelling their release into the United States. The District Court
granted the motion. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 2008).
The D.C. Circuit reversed. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1032 (D.C. Cir 2009). The D.C.
Circuit held that district courts cannot order the release of Guantnamo Bay detainees into the
United States. See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
on October 20, 2009. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77
U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-1234).
91. The panel applied the DTA's standard requiring that a CSRT determination be based on "a
preponderance of the evidence." DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i), 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006).
92. Pub. L. 107-40 §§ 1-2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (allowing President George Bush "to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.").
93. Parhat,532 F.3d at 844, 848. The court also sidestepped whether the President could lawfully
detain Parhat under his commander-in-chief powers. Id. at 842.
94. Id. at 844-50.

Muscular Procedure

The [government's] documents make assertions-often in haec
verba-about activities undertaken by [the ethnic Uighur
independence organization with which Parhat was believed to be
associated], and about that organization's relationship to al
Qaida and the Taliban. The documents repeatedly describe those
activities and relationships as having "reportedly" occurred, as
being "said to" or "reported to" have happened, and as things
that "may" be true or are "suspected of' having taken place. But
in virtually every instance, the documents do not say who
"reported" or "said" or "suspected" those things. Nor do they
provide any of the underlying reporting upon which the
documents' bottom-line assertions are founded, nor any
assessment of the reliability of that reporting. Because of those
omissions, the Tribunal could not and this court cannot assess
the reliability of the assertions in the documents. And because of
this deficiency, those bare assertions cannot sustain the
determination that Parhat is an enemy combatant.9 5
At least one federal district court conducting habeas review has used
Parhat-style analysis to rule on the propriety or impropriety of detention
in a number of cases. District Judge Richard J. Leon has resolved a
number of the Boumediene petitions on remand by analyzing the
transparency and external verifiability of the government's evidence.96
Although Judge Leon had ruled previously that the detainees lacked any
cognizable rights under statutory habeas 97 -suggesting dim prospects for
the detainees' claims-he resolved the underlying merits of the petitions
before him, determining that detention was improper in five of the cases,
and proper in the sixth.98
The government alleged that all six petitioners had planned a trip to
Afghanistan in late 2001 to take up arms against U.S. and allied forces,
and it supported that claim with one piece of evidence: "a classified
95. Id. at 846-47 (footnotes omitted).
96. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008). Six of Judge Leon's cases were
consolidated with the petitions in the In re Guanidnamo Detainee Cases before the D.C. Circuit in
Bounediene, and reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court.
97. Judge Leon concluded that the detainees lacked any cognizable constitutional rights that
could be vindicated through habeas. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005)
(Leon, J.). Another judge held by contrast that the detainees enjoyed Fifth Amendment due process
protections. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005) (Green,
J.).
98. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
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document from an unnamed source" lacking in "information to
adequately evaluate the credibility and reliability of this source's
information." 99 The government provided no indication of "the
circumstances under which the source obtained the information as to
each petitioner's alleged knowledge and intentions."' 100 Under such
circumstances, Judge Leon held that the government could not sustain its
relatively low burden to justify holding the five men for whom the
alleged trip to Afghanistan constituted the exclusive basis for their
detention:
Because I cannot, on the record before me, adequately assess the
credibility and reliability of the sole source information relied
upon, for five of the petitioners, to prove an alleged plan by
them to travel to Afghanistan to engage U.S. and coalition
forces, the Government has failed to carry its burden with
respect to these petitioners ....To allow enemy combatancy to

rest on so thin a reed would be inconsistent with this Court's
obligation under the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi to
protect petitioners from the risk of erroneous detention. 101
Judge Leon explicitly declined to address the meaning of "directly
support[ing] hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces"' 0 2 (the basis of the
men's classification as enemy combatants at Guantdnamo despite their
lack of direct membership in al-Qaida or the Taliban); the substantive
question whether a mere plan unaccompanied by concrete acts to travel
to Afghanistan to take up arms is, as a matter of law, "supporting" alQaida under the operative definition of "enemy combatant"; or the scope
of the detainees' constitutional and procedural protections.10 3 Upon
resolving the definition of "enemy combatant,"' r he applied the light
preponderance standard to the facts placed in evidence, resolving the
5
0
merits of each case.

99. Id. at 197.
100. Id.
101. Id. (internal citation omitted).
102. Id. at 196 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008)).
103. Id. at 197.
104. See Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
105. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96. Emily Calhoun has argued that the government
should be placed under heavy burdens of proof. See Calhoun, supra note 70, at 79, 81, 91; see also
Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: JudicialReview, Due Process, and the Detention of
Alleged Terrorists as Enemy Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 39, 91-92 (2005) (arguing that the
language of the federal habeas corpus statute puts the burden of proof on the government to justify
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These cases were by no means simple, involving substantial briefing
on a variety of questions and often requiring extensive hearings. °6 But
Judge Leon reached the merits of the six cases before him-invalidating
enemy combatant designations and ordering release in five of them-by
insisting on a standard of thoroughness and transparency that the
government was unable or unwilling to meet.1°7 This approach, which
has been applied by other habeas judges,'0 8 could prove useful in
resolving the remaining habeas cases, which, in the wake of
Boumediene, involved more than 200 detainees. 109
3.

Courts Have Used ProceduralRules to ProtectDetaineesfrom
Torture Overseas

In Belbacha v. Bush, 110 the D.C. Circuit held that district courts could
grant preliminary injunctions blocking the transfer of detainees to
countries where they faced a risk of torture upon repatriation." 1 This
decision had seemed unlikely, if not impossible, because when Belbacha
was under consideration, the law of the D.C. Circuit rejected any basis
of federal jurisdiction over Guantanamo.1 2 At that point, its ruling had

detention).
106. The government's factual return in one case contained roughly 650 pages of exhibits and a
53-page narrative setting forth the basis upon which the government justified holding six
Guantdnamo detainees. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 195. The petitioners' traverse contained
approximately 1,650 pages of exhibits and a 200-page narrative. Id. A hearing on the proper
definition of "enemy combatant" took nearly four-and-one-half hours. Id. at 193.
107. Judge Leon has moved more quickly on his cases, in part because he refused to allow them
to be coordinated with more than 200 other habeas cases for resolution of administrative and
procedural matters (discussed supra note 88). See Rules Set for 113 Detainee Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/rules-set-for- 113-detainee-cases/
(noting that "Judge Leon is one of two judges who have refused to send their cases to [Judge]
Hogan for coordination"). District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan also chose to process his own cases.
See Analysis: Core of the Habeas Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Aug. 2, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/analysis-core-of-the-habeas-dispute/.
108. In many of the cases, judges have resolved the merits of detainee challenges by using an
approach similar to that of Judge Leon. See cases cited supra note 65.
109. See Sweeping Challenge to Detainee Process, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Nov. 18, 2008, http://

www.scotusblog.com/wp/sweeping-challenge-to-detainee-process/
some 200 prisoners [yet] to go forward... in District Court").

(noting "113 cases involving

110. 520 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
111. Id. at 458-59.
112. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 553 U.S.
2229, 2277 (2008).

-,

128 S. Ct.
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yet to be reversed by the Supreme Court in Boumediene. But that
jurisdictional bar did not prevent the Belbacha panel majority from
exercising jurisdiction and temporarily halting the transfer of a detainee
13
who alleged he would be tortured upon return to his native Algeria.'
The court reasoned that while the issue of constitutional habeas
14
jurisdiction was pending before the Supreme Court, the All Writs Act"
provided a basis for retaining jurisdiction, 1 5 allowing the court to issue a
writ to prevent any transfer until the constitutional questions raised in
16
the Boumediene appeal were resolved."
Belbacha did not explicitly mention concerns with the reliability or
thoroughness of the government's repatriation process, though
Belbacha's counsel did argue that the diplomatic assurances offered by
the Algerian government were unreliable given its history of reneging on
promises to treat other groups of detainees humanely upon their
return."l 7 At oral argument, the government was questioned about its
intentions to transfer Belbacha but refused to comment whether it was
18
even considering transferring him, much less where it might send him."
In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit raised "the seriousness of the harm
[Belbacha] claims to face, namely, torture at the hands of a foreign state
and of a terrorist organization," a factor the district court on remand
would have to weigh in its overall assessment of the merits of
Belbacha's request for a preliminary injunction. 19 Although the district

113. Belbacha, 520 F.3d at 454, 456. The case remains in litigation. See infra note 125 and
accompanying text.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
115. The All Writs Act, initially codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides: "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id. § 1651 (a)
(2006). Under the Act, a court can "avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its
duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of
justice entrusted to it." United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1977).
116. The D.C. Circuit determined that "when the Supreme Court grants certiorari to review this
court's determination that the district court lacks jurisdiction, a court can, pursuant to the All Writs
Act ... and during the pendency of the Supreme Court's review, act to preserve the status quo in
other cases raising the same jurisdictional issue if a party satisfies the criteria for issuing a
preliminary injunction." Belbacha, 520 F.3d at 457.
117. Brief for Appellant at 16-18, Belbacha,520 F.3d 452 (No. 07-5258).
118. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-27, Belbacha, 520 F.3d 452 (No. 07-5258). In a related
case, the D.C. Circuit raised questions during oral argument surrounding the quality of the
diplomatic assurance process. See infra note 242.
119. Belbacha, 520 F.3d at 459.
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court had initially denied relief,120 it issued the injunction when the case
returned on remand from the D.C. Circuit.'21
The decision temporarily halting Belbacha's return to Algeria sheds
light on a larger humanitarian problem involving men who could not
safely be returned to their home countries, 122 and while Belbacha has yet
to receive much scholarly attention, it speaks to the judiciary's power to
slow down the return of detainees when core protections against torture
are placed into doubt. 23 Implicitly, Belbacha raises the possibility of a
judicial check on the quality of executive branch commitments under
international law not to return individuals to countries where they face a
serious risk of torture. 124 Although the All Writs Act theoretically

120. Belbacha v. Bush, No. 05-2349, 2007 WL 2422031, at *2 (D.D.C. July 27, 2007).
121. Bacha v. Bush, No. 05-2349, Order (June 13, 2008) (enjoining the government from
transferring Belbacha pending resolution of additional legal issues presented by Boumediene).
122. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Hurdles FrustrateEffort to Shrink Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2007, at Al.
123. In a similar group of cases, courts required that the government provide thirty days' notice
prior to transferring a detainee from Guantdnamo. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. These
"transfer abeyance" orders allowed for a similar, torture-based challenge should that become
necessary. However, in 2009 the D.C. Circuit ruled in Kiyemba v. Obana (Kiyemba 11),
561 F.3d
509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that courts could no longer grant these transfer abeyance orders, as doing
so would interfere on matters of executive prerogative. See infra notes 194-99, 240-42 and
accompanying text.
124. The U. N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention], provides an example of such an executive
commitment. The United States acceded to the Refugee Convention in 1968. See Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223. At the core of its protection, Article 3 of
the Refugee Convention establishes that "[n]o contracting state shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner whatsoever" to a country where his "life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, [or] membership of a particular social group," an
obligation that the United States satisfies by providing a form of relief known as withholding of
removal. 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. The U.N. Convention Against Torture, which the United States
signed in 1988, prohibits its signatories from sending people to countries where they could face
torture. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114.
Implementing legislation makes it a matter of U.S. policy "not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture." The Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)). Regulations promulgated under FARRA provide that in the context of
removal proceedings, the United States is prohibited from sending individuals to countries where
they are "more likely than not to be tortured." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2008). However, the statute
expressly disclaims any private right of action. See FARRA § 2242(a), § 2242(d) (stating that this
"policy" shall not be "construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims
raised under the Convention [Against Torture] or this section ... except as part of the review of a
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provides only a temporary solution,
Belbacha's efforts have prevented
25
his return to Algeria to this day. 1
4.

Courts Have EndorsedLitigants' Efforts to Invoke Supplemental
ProceduralDevices

Procedure's muscularity is equally apparent when one considers
litigation strategies employing other procedural devices. Detainees were
able to acquire additional, critical guarantees and safeguards from their
larger victories: Rasul, for example, not only secured statutory habeas
rights for Guantdinamo detainees but also paved the way for attorneyclient visits,126 a system of legal mail, procedures governing classified
information (including the granting of security clearances to counsel),
and other entitlements. 27 In addition, detainees benefitted from
additional procedural mechanisms such as the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) 128 to secure Guantdnamo files that the Department of
Defense attempted to shield from public light.129 Owing to a number of
FOIA requests lodged by the Associated Press in 2004 and 2005, the
Department of Defense released transcripts of the tribunal proceedings

final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act"). It has been
interpreted to create no binding rights for protection from torture outside the limited context of
removal proceedings in immigration law. See, e.g., Comejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1086
(9th Cir. 2004) ("The FARR Act on its face clearly states that it does not create jurisdiction for a
court to review the ... application of Article 3 of the Torture Convention."), vacated as moot, 389
F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
125. The issue remains in litigation. See, e.g., Reply to Government's Opposition to Motion to
Govern Further Proceedings, Belbacha v. Obama, 08-5350 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 28, 2009).
126. See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantdnamo,60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1988
(2008).
127. See In re GuantAnamo Bay Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2004) (setting forth
procedures for counsel access to detainees).
128. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified as at amended 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
129. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow "War": FOIA, the Abuses of AntiTerrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1165 (2007)
(noting that the success of FOIA litigation "is worthy of remark, given the prior efforts to shield
Guantanamo from public review" and that "[tihe thousands of pages of transcripts [produced in the
wake of the litigation] paved the way for analyses casting doubt on the claim that Guantanamo
housed the 'worst of the worst,' even on the government's evidence"); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming March
2010) (manuscript at 68-69, on file with author) ("Statutes like the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and government in the sunshine requirements embodied new political demands for open
government that may have catalyzed judicial procedural developments.").
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as well as other documentation detailing
detainee conditions of
30
confinement and related information.'
The Guantdnamo transcripts secured through FOIA often provided
important exculpatory evidence, as in Parhat,where counsel brought to
the court's attention conflicting evidence from another detainee's CSRT
panel on a dispositive point upon which Parhat's tribunal had relied.'
That evidence also has value in litigation in other countries, even after
habeas petitions are conclusively resolved, and even if the Guantdnamo
detention facility is formally retired. 32 Many detainees already face
prosecution overseas once they are transferred into the custody of
foreign governments. 133 Although detainees might not be permitted to
seek discovery for their foreign criminal cases through their habeas
actions, given that release from Guantinamo appears to moot those
cases, 134 FOIA and other procedural devices 35could allow them to obtain
discovery in aid of their respective defenses.
130. See Scott Shane, A.C.L.U. Lawyers Mine Documents for Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2009,
at A4 (noting that efforts through a FOIA detention document request and a subsequent lawsuit
produced 130,000 pages of previously secret documents over a six-year period). The release of this
information has made possible empirical studies of hundreds of CSRT proceedings, including the
work of Mark Denbeaux and Joshua W. Denbeaux, cited infra at note 137, which culled through the
transcripts made available by FOIA to demonstrate the lack of evidence upon which many of the
detainees have been held at Guantnamo.
131. See Parhatv. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
132. For a discussion of the obstacles standing in the way of President Obama's promise to close
Guantdnamo, see Joseph Landau, Indefinite Detention Center, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/indefinite-detention-center.
133. Detainees can face prosecution under local laws that, unlike U.S. laws, prohibit terrorism
regardless of where the alleged wrongdoing actually occurred or what nation was allegedly targeted.
For example, detainees returned to Algeria could face prosecution under Article 87 of the Algerian
Penal Code, which outlaws membership or association with terrorist associations. See PERMANENT
MISSION OF ALGERIA TO THE U.N., REPORT SUBMITTED BY ALGERIA TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTION
1373 (2001), available at

http://www.algeria-un.org/default.asp?doc=1427 (referencing "Article I of Decree No. 93-03,
reproduced in article 87 bis of Ordinance No. 95.11 of 25 February 1995 amending and
supplementing Ordinance No. 66.156 of 8 June 1966 enacting the Penal Code" in a discussion of
the definition of terrorist acts, and noting that such acts include participation or enrollment in
terrorist organizations even while outside of Algeria). Because a decision ordering release in habeas
is not necessarily exoneration, see supra note 64, it may be necessary for detainees prosecuted
overseas to seek exculpatory information regardless of what ensues in their respective habeas cases.
134. At least one district court within the D.C. Circuit has explicitly refused to continue to
exercise habeas jurisdiction over a petitioner no longer in custody, despite the possibility of a
foreign prosecution arising out of incarceration at Guantinamo. See Al Joudi v. Bush, No. 05-CV0301, 2008 WL 821884, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2008) (dismissing as "speculative" the claim of a
detainee transferred to Saudi Arabia who did not face immediate prosecution but who claimed to
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How ProceduralRules Check Insufficient CoordinateBranch
Decision-Making

In addition to bringing cases to effective resolution, procedural
rulings have placed important checks on coordinate branch decision-

making lacking in integrity or professionalism. Courts have conditioned
deference by requiring a more thorough and searching coordinate branch
process in the Executive's interpretations of vague authorizing

face "potential future monitoring by the Saudi Government, travel restrictions, and/or future
prosecution"); see also Idema v. Rice, 478 F. Supp. 2d 47, 52 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that the court is
"keenly aware of case law suggesting that it does not have jurisdiction over a habeas petition
stemming from a foreign conviction and sentence" except where a habeas petitioner alleges "U.S.
control over petitioners' arrest, conviction, appeal, and confinement"). Relatedly, in Qassim v. Bush,
466 F.3d 1073, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the court held that the voluntary release of two ethnic
Uighurs to Albania mooted their habeas claim for lack of any collateral consequence flowing out of
their incarceration at Guanthnamo. That court took the approach that the only form of post-relief
habeas remedy it could recognize is an action for money damages; claims at equity, by contrast, do
not "survive release from incarceration." Id.
135. One little-known procedural device that could be especially useful for obtaining exculpatory
evidence is 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a statute commonly used in international commercial litigation.
Detainees could try to invoke Section 1782 to subpoena documents from U.S. personnel who would
be otherwise immune from suit under U.S. or foreign substantive law, and immune from discovery
under the law of the foreign forum. Under the statute, "the district court of the district in which a
person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or a statement or to produce a
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may
be made ... upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or
statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the
court." 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006). Litigants invoke this statute most frequently in foreign
commercial litigation, where a party in need of discovery and unable to acquire it under the laws of
the foreign forum instead seeks U.S. discovery against a person or corporation found within the
United States. See, e.g., Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 154 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998). Parties in
overseas criminal litigation have successfully invoked Section 1782 as well. See, e.g., In re Request
for Judicial Assistance from the Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1977).
Should detainees released from Guantinamo become subject to prosecution overseas, discovery
orders obtained through Section 1782 could be instrumental in securing exculpatory evidence that
the U.S. government might otherwise be unwilling to provide. Of course, there are limitations to the
discovery that can be sought through this vehicle. In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241 (2004), the Supreme Court articulated a series of comity factors guiding a district
court's decision to grant discovery under Section 1782. It also noted that the statute expressly
shields privileged material. Id. at 260. The government would certainly attempt to quash a subpoena
on grounds of privilege, though there is no reason why its motion to quash would be granted on that
basis alone; after all, the government is already being required to provide massive discovery to
detainees, as evidenced by Bismullah, see supra Part II.A. 1, as well as in the post-Boumediene
habeas cases (though generally less in those cases than what had been ordered in Bismullah), see
supra note 88.
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legislation and in its implementation of a congressional delegation.
Similarly, courts have required that Congress oversee executive branch
decision-making through clear legislation. These decisions respect the
expertise of the political branches on substantive policy questions while
asserting judicial authority over the types of procedural matters where
courts have a comparative advantage in expertise.
1.

Curbing Executive Branch Overreach

The Court's decisions from Rasul through Boumediene reject a type
of executive overreach that a classic doctrinal procedural approach could
easily obscure. As a basic matter, the Hamdi Court acknowledged that
"our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking
belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically
accountable for making them,"'1 36 while rejecting the government's effort
to "condense power into a single branch of government."' 37 Yet the
136. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004). Similar statements of deference are found
throughout prior Supreme Court decisions. See id. at 579-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing cases);
Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (expressing a reluctance "to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 64-65 (1981) ("[Plerhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference
[than in military affairs and national defense]."); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
668-74 (1981) (holding that despite the lack of explicit congressional authorization for presidential
action, congressional silence was tantamount to authorization for the purposes of evaluating that
action under Youngstown's most deferential standard); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (acknowledging "broad powers in military commanders engaged in dayto-day fighting in a theater of war").
137. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (emphasis omitted). Six Justices concluded that even if the
Executive had the authority to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, the Constitution imposed
constraints on that authority, rejecting "the Government's most extreme ...argument [that]
'[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of
military decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict' ought to eliminate entirely any
individual process, restricting the courts to investigating only whether legal authorization exists for
the broader detention scheme." Id. at 527 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26, Handi, 542 U.S.
507 (No. 03-6696)). Hamdi was consistent with the Court's other decisions rejecting efforts by the
Bush Administration to consolidate all national security decision-making within the executive
branch. In Rasul, for instance, the government argued that "[tihe 'enemy' status of aliens captured
and detained during war is a quintessential political question on which the courts respect the actions
of the political branches," and that with respect to these matters, "courts have... no judiciallymanageable standards ...to evaluate or second-guess the conduct of the President or the military."
Brief for the Respondent at 35, 37 n.19, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343),
2004 WL 425739; see also id. at 43 ("[E]xercising jurisdiction ... would thrust the federal courts
");
into the extraordinary role of reviewing the military's conduct of hostilities overseas ....
Waxman, supra note 47, at7 (noting that prior to the Court's decision in Hamdi, the government
argued that "the Executive should have unreviewable discretion to decide if an individual falls
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Court went beyond simply applying standard due process analysis to the
question of executive detention.
At first blush, Hamdi seems to have merely applied the seminal (and
highly deferential) balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,'38 allowing the
Executive to determine the content of the procedures it would use to vet
its own enemy-combatant determinations.1 39 But the Court went much
further by rejecting the government's attempt to supply evidence lacking
in basic indicia of reliability. The Court refused to credit the
government's proffered two-page declaration containing generic
references and hearsay testimony to support Hamdi's detention, which,
the Court held, lacked a sufficient foundation on which to accord
deference to the Executive. 140 In the Court's words, "[a]ny process in
which the Executive's factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are
simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged
combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.'' 1 1 For
the conditions of deference to obtain, the Executive would have to
42
satisfy a judicially imposed standard of procedural regularity.1

within the definition of enemy combatant, and that it should have unreviewable discretion to
determine the scope of the definition itself'); MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NoHEARINGS HEARINGS: CRST: THE MODERN HABEAS CORPUS? AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS AT GUANTANAMO 4 (2006),

http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/final-no-hearing-hearings-report.pdf (-As soon
as most of the CSRT hearings were completed, the Government informed the District Court in
which the habeas proceedings were pending that, despite the Supreme Court's ruling, no further
judicial action was necessary because the detainees had been given CSRT review.").
138. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In his Hamdi dissent, Justice Scalia chided the plurality for resolving
the question by resort to Mathews v. Eldridge, a case he mockingly described as "involving... the
withdrawalof disability benefits!" Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-33. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion left it to the executive
branch to determine those procedures, noting that the "ongoing military conflict" might require
vastly curtailed procedural rights. Id. at 533-34 ("Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as
the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so
long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were
provided."). The government would also be permitted to use military tribunals in lieu of standard
civilian courts. See id. at 538.
140. Id. at 537-38.
141. Id. at 537.
142. Boumediene also noted that, throughout history, "it has been possible to leave the outer
boundaries of war powers undefined," Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277
(2008), but the Court imposed limits on executive detention by subjecting executive branch
determinations to habeas corpus review in light of shortcomings within the Executive's process.
Hamdan also rejected the government's effort to usurp the judicial role in interpreting statutory and

Muscular Procedure
Parhat followed the same approach, conditioning judicial deference
on a "meaningful review of the record" 143 and rejecting efforts by the
government to furnish the court with materials that failed its baseline test
for reliability and accuracy, refusing merely to "rubber-stamp the
government's charges."' 44 While the court sought "neither [to] prescribe
nor proscribe possible ways in which the government may demonstrate
the reliability of its evidence," it "reject[ed] the government's contention
that it can prevail by submitting documents that read as if they were
indictments or civil complaints, and that simply assert as facts the
elements required to prove that a detainee falls within the definition of
enemy combatant."'' 45 The government's effort to proceed otherwise
came "perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says
must be treated as true, thus rendering superfluous both the role of the
[CSRT] and the role that Congress assigned to this court."' 146 Anything
less would merely "place a judicial imprimatur on an act of essentially
unreviewable executive discretion."1 47 The district court in Boumediene
similarly rejected the government's reliance on an uncorroborated
intelligence report as conclusive evidence supporting indefinite
detention. While such information was "sufficient for the intelligence
purposes for which it was prepared, it is not sufficient
for the purposes
' 14 8
for which a habeas court must now evaluate it.
Hamdi also placed a further check on executive overreach by
narrowly interpreting executive authority under the AUMF. The Court
treaty law by virtually eliminating federal court second-guessing of executive branch
interpretations. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARv. L. REV. 65, 97 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Legal Academy] ("[Tihe
government argued that the President's interpretations of statutory and treaty law were entitled to
extreme deference.").
143. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d
178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 850.
146. Id. at 849.
147. Id. at 836. The government also tried to control the public disclosure of unclassified
information by requiring counsel for the detainees to file certain unclassified information under seal,
with minimal explanation why information previously deemed unclassified should be kept from
public disclosure. Id. at 852-53. In Bismullah and Parhat,the D.C. Circuit rejected that effort as an
attempt to usurp the judicial role by "permitting the government unilaterally to determine whether
information is 'protected."' Id. at 852 (citing Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 188) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
148. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008).
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noted repeatedly that its holding permitting executive detention applied
only to "the limited category [of detainees] we are considering,"' 149 not
150
the far broader category of individuals being detained at Guantdnamo.
This caveat indicated potential problems with the Executive's attempt to
use the AUMF as a source of broad detention authority that would bring
under its ambit individuals with no clear or direct ties to al-Qaida or the
Taliban. 15 ' As Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal have pointed out, cases such
as Hamdi, by imposing limits on executive authority under the AUMF,
"reassured Congress that it can pass something like the AUMF and not
' 52
have it interpreted in ludicrous ways by the executive."'
149. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); see also id. at 516 ("We therefore answer
only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling within [the
government's narrow] definition is authorized."). The AUMF was a broad and general endorsement
for force, not a specific authorization legitimizing indefinite detention, especially in light of the
countervailing Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006), which, as noted by two of the
Justices, requires direct and specific congressional authorization to detain U.S. citizens like Hamdi.
See id. at 542-46 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
150. The government defined an "enemy combatant" in Hamdi as an individual who was "part of
or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and who
"engaged in an armed conflict against the United States." See id. at 516 (quoting Brief for
Respondents at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696)). This double requirement effectively made
battlefield capture a prerequisite to executive detention as an enemy combatant. After Hamdi, the
government severed the two requirements it had made part of its definition to persuade the Court in
that case, defining "enemy combatant" as "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners," including "any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy
Sec'y of Def., for the Sec'y of the Navy, at 1 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Jul2004/d2004O7O7review.pdf (emphasis added). Severing the two conditions permitted
the Executive to detain persons with far more attenuated connections to al-Qaida or the Taliban. See
In re Guantnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[C]ounsel for the
respondents argued that the Executive has the authority to detain the following individuals until the
conclusion of the war on terrorism: '[a] little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she
thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-Qaeda
activities,' a person who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda member and a joumalist who
knows the location of Osama Bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source." (internal
citations omitted)).
151. See supra note 150.
152. Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, DisregardingForeign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1230, 1276, 1276 n.172 (2007) (citing Hamdi's reading of the AUMF in light of "longstanding lawof-war principles," including the Geneva Conventions); see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519-21. Although
the Boumediene Court gestured toward the AUMF as the basis for the confinement of enemy
combatants at Guantdnamo, it sidestepped any inquiry into whether the AUMF was expansive
enough to cover that far broader definition of "enemy combatant," declining to "address the content
of the law that governs petitioners' detention." Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2229,
2271-72, 2277 (2008). Instead, the Court credited for the sake of argument the government's

Muscular Procedure
This judicial check on executive overreach occurred within a broader
context of executive unilateralism in surveillance and detention policy.
Rasul and Hamdi were preceded by the April 24, 2004 revelations about
the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib 1 53 Similarly, before the Hamdan
merits briefs were filed, The New York Times reported that President
Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to monitor
Americans in seeming violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.154 Meanwhile, numerous executive branch personnel began
to express opposition to executive branch polices regarding detention,
surveillance, and torture. 55 This atmosphere sharpened the need for a
heightened judicial attentiveness to executive branch overreach in
implementing security-related policy.
2.

ManagingIntra-BranchDeliberation

Courts have also conditioned their deference on a requisite level of
intra-branch deliberation, including procedural rigor in the
implementation of security-related policy by various administrative arms
of the executive branch. Both Boumediene and Bismullah place a

position that the CSRT procedures, and the definition of "enemy combatant" that it employed to
adjudge enemy combatant determinations, complied with Hamdi. Id. at 2241 ("The Government
maintains these procedures were designed to comply with the due process requirements identified
by the plurality in Hamdi.").
153. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supranote 142, at 92.
154. Id.
155. Examples abound. In one well-known case, Navy Lieutenant Commander Matthew Diaz,
infuriated at the treatment of the detainees after a six-month tour of duty as a Guantdnamo legal
adviser, anonymously mailed computer printouts containing the detainees' identities to the Center
for Constitutional Rights. See Brooks Egerton, Losing a Fight for Detainees, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 18, 2007, at 18A. Diaz was convicted, sentenced to six months' imprisonment, and
dishonorably discharged. See Tim Golden, Naming Names at Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct.
21, 2007, at 83. Colonel Morris Davis, the former chief prosecutor of the Guantinamo Bay military
commissions, resigned out of protest over command interference in the commission process and the
use of evidence obtained by torture. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Ex-Guantanamo Prosecutor to
Testify for Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at A18. Susan Crawford, the top military judge
overseeing the Guantinamo military tribunals, admitted to Bob Woodward that detainee
Mohammed al-Qahtani had been tortured. William Glaberson, Detainee Was Tortured, a Bush
Official Confirms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at A22; see also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) (discussing, inter
alia, the debate within the Justice Department over the legality of surveillance and interrogation
policies). For a broader inquiry into the role of government lawyers in resisting the improper
influence of politics in the content of law, see W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers,
Democracy,and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1333 (2009).
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judicial check on the managerial competence of the Guantdinamo
tribunals by asserting a role for the courts in curing bureaucratic error.
The cases were decided after high-ranking personnel disclosed numerous
administrative mistakes in the implementation of the rules governing
CSRT tribunals, 5 6 including failures in evidence-gathering and the
57
presence of command influence in the decision-making process.
Bismullah's requirement that the government embark upon a broad and
far-reaching search for discovery documentation was one way to cure
the executive branch's acknowledgment that "it ha[d] not utilized the
procedure for compiling the CSRT record that the Department of
Defense specified in its publicly-announced procedures for conducting
CSRTs. ' ' Bismullah invoked the rules of discovery to provide
oversight where the executive branch inadequately managed its own
review process.
Boumediene takes the point about administrative incompetence even
further by wresting oversight of enemy combatant determinations from
the executive branch (through its CSRT process) and restoring a
collateral review mechanism within Article III habeas courts. When the
Supreme Court initially denied certiorari, Justice Stevens (joined by
Justice Kennedy) wrote a statement supporting the decision to allow the
administrative process of the DTA to run its course before providing
collateral review. 59 The Court reversed itself, however, after the parties
submitted declarations attesting to the executive branch's inadequate
implementation of its own standards and procedures. Boumediene thus
restored collateral review for a procedurally defective DTA
process
60
within the more trusted institution of federal habeas courts.
156. See supra note 78.
157. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also DecI. of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant
Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, E 5-24, Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 2007)
(No. 06-1197); DecI. of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy, t 4-6, 10-13,
Bismullah, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 2007) (No. 06-1197).
158. Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 193 (Rogers, J., concurring).
159. The two Justices reasoned that, given the Court's "practice of requiring the exhaustion of
available remedies as a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ of
habeas corpus," the detainees would have to first exhaust their administrative remedy. Boumediene
v. Bush, 549 U.S 1328, 1329 (2007) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring), vacated, 551 U.S. 1160
(2007).
160. To the extent that Guantdnamo detainees had a choice between the DTA and habeas, postBoumediene decisions eliminated that option, and detainees now must proceed exclusively through
habeas. See Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1072-75 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also supra note 87
and accompanying text.

694

Muscular Procedure
Parhat also raises the issue of intra-branch deliberation, specifically
the outward disagreement among various arms of the executive branch
over the question of Parhat's dangerousness and the need to hold him in
detention. The court cited a 2003 recommendation by a military officer
of the Department of Defense recommending Parhat's release, as well as
a statement made by the government during Parhat's CSRT hearing that
he "does represent an attractive candidate for release."' 6 1 The court also
observed that although the government had in its possession exculpatory
evidence that contradicted a point upon which Parhat's tribunal had
relied, it never provided that evidence to the tribunal, undermining the
court's confidence that the tribunals had followed their own standards
and procedures. 62 Such inadequacies in bureaucratic competency made
it necessary for the courts to exercise heightened judicial scrutiny of the
executive branch's adherence to its own standards and procedures.
Hamdan illustrates a similar judicial concern with intra-branch
deliberation and accountability. As Neil Katyal points out, one can read
Hamdan as rejecting executive decision-making that did not conform to
reasoned interpretation by seasoned veterans within the relevant arms of
the executive branch. For example, the Court rejected the President's
interpretation that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not
apply to the conflict with al-Qaida,163 a point of conflict between the
President and longtime agency experts, including the Judge Advocates
General and the Department of State. 164 More generally, the President's
military commission system rejected in Hamdan lacked the support of
the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and top military
officials.' 65 Hamdan did not explicitly raise the issue of deviations
between the President's position and the view held by veterans in the
field, but its holding can be understood in part as a rejection of

161. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
162. Id. at 845-46 (citation omitted).
163. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006).
164. See Katyal, LegalAcademy, supra note 142, at 105.
165. See id. at 109-10 ("The Administration, when it designed the commissions, ignored
Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and their staffs. It
was also well known that the commission plan was pushed through over the disagreement of
members of the military's top brass. The informality of many of the determinations concerned the
Hamdan majority. It dismissed the Administration's arguments that press statements by cabinet
members were valid 'determinations' entitling the President to deference ....[Tihe Court wanted
to see rigorous support, or any support, rather than incomplete conjecture.").
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"executive action taken without the prior involvement of experts. ' 66
Under the circumstances, "[b]razenly advocating for a different
executive branch process could potentially undermine the legitimacy of
the Court .... Any second-guessing of the Executive could take place, if
at all, only between the lines of a judicial opinion, for fear of treading on
executive ground."' 167 In this respect, Hamdan also suggests a judicial
response to flawed
internal workings of the Executive's administrative
68
bureaucracies.1
3.

Responding to CongressionalAbdication

Another function of muscular procedure is to provide a backstop
where Congress neglects its duty to enact policy, or does so without
reasoned deliberation. Here, too, the judiciary refuses to accede to a
process marked by congressional abdication. After passing the AUMF
and the USA PATRIOT Act shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Congress did
relatively little for several years.169 As Katyal notes, "It did not affirm or
regulate President Bush's decision to use military commissions to try
unlawful belligerents. It stood silent when President Bush accepted
thinly reasoned legal views of the Geneva Conventions.' 7 ° When
166. Id. at 109; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's
Most DangerousBranch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2340 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers] ("The Bush Administration's chief argument in federal court against, for
example, the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to detainees at Guant~namo has been that
OLC and the President have determined that the Conventions do not apply. Had a neutral
adjudicator prepared a full 'lower court' opinion for final presidential decision, the case for judicial
deference to the President would have been stronger.").
167. Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 112.
168. The government's last-minute, mid-litigation policy changes further support the idea that
poor bureaucratic decisions may have contributed to the government's losses in court. The
government created a review procedure for Guanthnamo detainees the same day that it filed its
Rasul merits briefs in the Supreme Court. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 90. In the
Padillacase, the government, after years of denying Padilla an attorney, allowed him to meet with a
lawyer just before its Supreme Court briefs were due. Id. The government also changed the rules on
military commission strategies after the certiorari petition was filed in Hamdan. Id. These aboutface maneuverings may have deepened the judiciary's lack of confidence in the executive branch's
deliberative process, even where its actions were technically authorized by Congress.
169. Congress passed the AUMF one week after 9/11, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1-2, 115 Stat. 224
(Sept. 18, 2001), and the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001),
within two months of 9/11.
170. Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 166, at 2319; id. at 2316 ("Publius's view
of separation of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their
powers, yet [after 9/11] legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi. It is often remarked

Muscular Procedure
Congress did get around to passing the DTA after Rasul and the MCA
after Hamdan,171 it proceeded through a "quick and inevitably messy
quilting bee" that left unresolved a mounting series of issues surrounding
the confinement of Guantdnamo detainees. 72 Where Congress left a gap,
Rasul and Hamdan required a clear legislative statement to ensure that
executive detention policies would be based on more than unilateral
interpretations of statutory and constitutional law.
The compromised state of the MCA was further evident within
statements by individual members of Congress who, even while voting
in favor of the statute, openly declared their belief in its
unconstitutionality. 173 In response, Boumediene struck down portions of
the legislation that "Congress ...wanted to see judicially invalidated, or
at least substantially altered, by the courts.' 7 4 According to District
that '9/11 changed everything'; particularly so in the war on terror, in which Congress has been
absent or content to pass vague, open-ended statutes. The result is an executive that subsumes much
of the tripartite structure of government."); see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at 1277 (noting
"the abdication of Congress for the five years after the September 11, 2001, attacks in many of the
key decisions [involving national security]"); James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55
BuFF.L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2008) (["[A]fter Hamdan v.Rumsfeld,] Congress not only authorized the
Executive to conduct trials by military commission at GuantAnamo Bay, but, en passant, it also
stripped the federal courts of their statutory jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions or any other
actions filed by aliens who are detained as enemy combatants or who are even awaiting a
determination of whether or not they are enemy combatants. So much for what I had thought was
the fecklessness of the legislature!"); infra note 172 and accompanying text.
171. Section 7 of the MCA replaced the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provision with clearer
language stripping statutory habeas jurisdiction for all habeas claims, including cases that were
pending at the time of its enactment. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note (2006)) (applying the jurisdictional bar in "all cases, without
exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the
detention ...of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001"); see also
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2243 (2008) ("[Wle cannot ignore that the
MCA was a direct response to Hamdan's holding that the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provision
had no application to pending cases."). The MCA left intact the limited review mechanism under the
DTA for federal review in the D.C. Circuit.
172. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 106; see also id. at 104 n.158 (noting that
"the MCA was rushed through Congress with no deliberation"); id. at 115 ("Instead of engaging in a
sober debate about the meaning of constitutional text, history, and precedent, Congress rushed the
MCA through without much thought to the constitutional consequences."). But cf Boumediene, 128
S. Ct. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The political branches crafted these procedures amidst an
ongoing military conflict, after much careful investigation and thorough debate.").
173. See, e.g., Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed
by Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at Al 3 (reporting that Sen. Specter voted for the MCA after
telling reporters the bill was "patently unconstitutional").
174. Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally UnconstitutionalLaw: The Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 282 (2008).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 84:661, 2009

Judge James Robertson, who oversaw the Hamdan litigation in district
court, "it may be that Congress was stampeded into thinking that
unscrupulous lawyers and activist judges would just gum things up at
Guantdnamo. If that is what Congress thought, it had faulty
intelligence." 75 Given the lack of serious consideration by Congress or
the Executive, the judiciary, "the only other structural actor with a longterm perspective" on the democratic process,176 provided a vital stopgap
measure requiring the77political branches to engage in a more thorough,
deliberative process.1
III.

PUTTING MUSCULAR PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT

A.

MuscularProcedureand Civil Libertarianism

Because so much of the post-9/11 literature focuses on the ways that
judicial decisions have been insufficiently substantive, it tends to
overlook how procedural decisions have been muscular. While civil
libertarians claim that procedural decisions conceal a surreptitious
advancement of a substantive agenda through opportunistic commitment
to procedural principles, 178 the force of this observation, which has
175. See Robertson, supra note 170, at 1084-85.
176. Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 105; see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at
1264.
177. For an exceptionally vibrant depiction of the general type of problem described above, see
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80,
103-04 (1991):
Legislatures often act hastily or thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental rights because of
panic or crises or because, more often, they are simply pressed for time. At other times, they
hide infringements of rights through vague language or give no thought to the reach of the
language they have used. At still other times, they delegate to bureaucrats who are not
accountable to the people and who therefore cannot be trusted with the protection of rights.
Legislatures also often shirk responsibility by failing to repeal old laws that have come-either
through growth in rights or through change in the effect of the old laws-to violate
entitlements that would be deemed fundamental if the issue were truly addressed today. All the
above cases are instances of a breakdown of accountability that affects fundamental rights, and
thus could be called failures of "constitutional accountability." The two most general
categories of such breakdown are "haste or thoughtlessness" and "hiding."
The Bickellian approach to judicial review is based on the notion that, even if majoritarian
legislatures are generally more trustworthy and less dangerous than courts as the definers and
bulwarks of fundamental rights, when there is haste or hiding we cannot rely only on
legislators to protect such rights. When there is hiding, neither the people nor their
representatives are genuinely speaking; when there is haste, they may be speaking, but without
the attention required for the protection of rights.
178. Civil libertarians also have critiqued legal process approaches as lacking any real theoretical
explanation for why procedure should be valued in its own right. As Larry Tribe has noted, purely

Muscular Procedure
relevance in many contexts, may have less traction in national security.
Martinez appeals to that idea by arguing that "[tihe danger of Legal
Process... is that its seeming neutrality often obscures value judgments
about the underlying substantive policies."'' 79 Accordingly, "[t]o the
extent that seemingly fair procedures distract people from unfair

substantive

outcomes,

these

uses

of

procedure

may

be

dangerous .... [Tihe legitimizing role that procedure plays in
'Is°
perceptions of justice may be part of the problem, not the solution."
But while modem interpretations of standing doctrine,18 statutes of
limitations, 182 pleading standards,1 3 immunity doctrines, 18 and privilege

process-based theories of law must be based within a theory of the intrinsic worthiness of process
itself; if not, a true theoretical commitment to process breaks down. See Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1070-71
(1980).
179. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1025. Martinez notes that even though "we may choose to vest
certain decisions in Congress because we believe that body's deliberative nature is likely to lead to
better policy choices," id. at 1061, procedural decisions "cannot provide a total escape from hard
substantive choices; when the main benefit of procedure is that it hides those substantive choices,
we ought to be concerned," id. at 1092.
180. Id. at 1087.
181. Specifically, the Supreme Court elevated the requirements of causation and redressability,
two criteria generally considered part of a court's merits inquiry, into two of the three elements
necessary to establish standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1200 (1993) (arguing that Lujan will
result in fewer lawsuits, permitting agencies to ignore legislative commands). Justice Brennan
echoed the civil libertarian concern when he referred to certain procedural doctrines as "no more
than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the underlying claims." Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court,
1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23
(1982) ("This ritual recitation [of the components of standing doctrine] having been performed, the
Court then chooses up sides and decides the case."); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing
Requirement: The UnprincipledUse of JudicialRestraint, 69 KY. L.J. 185, 185 (1980-1981) ("One
of the most controversial methods employed by the Burger Court to temper the expansion of
standing under the broad injury-in-fact test has been the development of an autonomous doctrine of
causation."); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of By, and Forthe People:
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 72 (2008) ("[Tjhe causation
doctrine.., embroils the threshold standing determination too heavily in the merits and works to
undermine the Court's role in protecting individuals from harm resulting from illegal government
activity.") (quoting Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 664 (1977)).
182. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 641 (2007) (denying
remedy to plaintiff challenging unlawful sex discrimination on grounds that her initial complaint
was filed after the expiration of the 180-day statutory maximum after her first instance of
discrimination); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007).
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law 85 have at times placed procedure in the way of efforts to vigorously
enforce statutes requiring the executive branch to fulfill its
responsibilities, 86 the post-9/1 1 context has unfolded quite differently.
While civil libertarians correctly note that deferring on substantive
decisions can prolong injustice, not least the mistreatment of detainees
during their extended periods of unlawful confinement, 87 procedural
rulings in this context have generally not been a mechanism for
"hid[ing] ... substantive choices." 88 Rather, courts have been clear
about the underlying normative basis for asserting values of
transparency and deliberation, "mak[ing] explicit their substanceoriented justifications for procedural steps"'1 89 and usefully calling the
political branches to account for failing to make apparent their own
substantive commitments or faithfully following through on their own
procedural commitments. The result has been a dialogue in the service of
prompting substantive reform where the political branches already
appear to have agreed on an untenable course of action.

183. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). Twombly retired the interpretation of FED. R. Civ. P. 8
articulated within Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), according to which motions to
dismiss would not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts.., which would entitle him to relief," Twombly, 570 U.S. at 561, appearing to replace that
rule with a "plausibility standard" that would require plaintiffs to "nudge[] their claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible" to survive a motion to dismiss, id. at 570.
184. This includes sovereign immunity, as expanded under recent Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, as well as qualified immunity doctrines. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 181, at 97104.
185. See id. at 92 ("Government privileges have expanded-particularly the state secrets and
executive privilege doctrines-unnecessarily keeping information about the people's government
from themselves. The interest in accurate judicial fact-finding and our ability to scrutinize the
government's decision-making process are important reasons to limit this growth of secrecy.").
186. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article 11, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 194 (1992); see also Andrew M. Siegel, Notes Towards an
Alternate Vision of the Judicial Role, 32 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 511-13 (2009).
187. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
188. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1092.
189. See Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules,
84 YALE L.J. 718, 736 (1975). Robert Cover emphasized the flexibility of procedural rules, noting
that procedural mechanisms could be used as a device to resolve cases where the substantive law
offers no solution for a just outcome. But he abhorred the deployment of procedure, for however a
noble purpose, that was unhinged from a larger substantive purpose, for such decisions failed to
reduce uncertainty, treated litigants unequally, and failed to advance a rule of procedure that could
apply to all cases. See id. at 726-28.

Muscular Procedure
In this regard, Stephen Vladeck observes that recent decisions are
"characterized by narrow holdings and implicit guidance to the political
branches on how to avoid more serious confrontations."'' 90 Within those
decisions, "a conversation between the [Supreme] Court and the political
branches [takes place] in several acts." 191 Anthony Colangelo argues,
similarly, that "the Court ...has sought not to create clear, categorical
substantive rules," but has instead "adopted methodologies by which the
national security/individual rights balance can be carefully weighed
based on the particular circumstances of a particular case[]" what he
calls "legal conversation-starters.' ' 192 The decisions integrate procedural
requirements into legal contexts where, doctrinally, courts generally
93
recognize coordinate branch expertise on substantive policy questions.1
Still, the judiciary puts procedural tools to muscular effect, reinforcing
its concern about deeper rule-of-law considerations by ruling on matters
about which it has a comparative advantage in expertise.
In cases where courts have rejected a muscular procedural approachas, for instance, where they ground their decisions in a standard of pure
deference-they have done damage to the causes that civil libertarians
champion. In these cases of pure deference, courts have blocked efforts
to enforce executive branch obligations under domestic and treaty law,
including commitments to protect detainees from torture overseas. For
example, in Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba 11),194 the D.C. Circuit handed
detainees a very unfavorable ruling on the issue of repatriations to
countries where they fear torture.1 95 Kiyemba H invalidated more than
one hundred transfer-abeyance motions, which district courts granted
both before and after Boumediene, requiring the government to provide
counsel for a detainee thirty days' notice prior to effecting a transfer
from Guantfnamo. 96 On the question of federal jurisdiction, the court
190. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the FederalCourts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox,
43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 893, 897 (2009).
191. Id. at 910.
192. Anthony J. Colangelo, Brief Remarks on the Supreme Court's Role After 9/11: Continuing

the Legal Conversation in the War on Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 17, 18 (2009) (emphases omitted);
see also id. at 21-22 ("[B]y guarding the constitutional dimensions of the war on terror from
political conversation-stoppers, the Court actually facilitates ongoing public deliberation over the
national security/individual rights balance.").
193. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
194. 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
195. Id. at 516.
196. The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, Jurisdiction Over Americans Held
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resolved an issue, apparently left open by Boumediene, whether
detainees could invoke habeas as a vehicle for challenging matters
collateral to detention, such as conditions of confinement, transfer and
release.1 97 But on the broader question of detainee transfers, Kiyemba II
ruled flatly that courts cannot second-guess executive branch expertise
on the human rights practices of foreign countries, regardless of the
detainees' claims that they would be harmed upon return. In the words
of the D.C. Circuit, district courts simply "may not question the
Government's determination that a potential recipient country is not
likely to torture a detainee ...[and] a detainee cannot prevail on the
merits of a claim seeking to bar his transfer based upon the likelihood of
his being tortured in the recipient country."' 98 The court's reliance on
Overseas, 122 HARV. L. REV. 415, 421 (2008). Prior to Kiyemba II, the thirty-day notice motions
were generally granted. See Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guant6namo: The Law of International
Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 667 (2006) ("[B]y the end of June 2005, judges had
decided thirty-four of the GTMO transfer motions, with twenty-seven pro-detainee decisions
imposing the requested notice requirement and six pro-government decisions denying that relief
(one split decision granted relief to one petitioner but denied it to two others)."); see also Ameziane
v. Bush, No. 05-0392, 2005 WL 839542 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2005) (requiring notice pursuant to All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)); AI-Joudi v. Bush, No. 05-301, 2005 WL 774847 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2005) (order granting request for preliminary injunction); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04- 1254, 2005 WL
711814 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) (same). But see Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 189
(D.D.C. 2005) (denying preliminary injunction for thirty-day notice order); Almurbati v. Bush, 366
F. Supp. 2d 72, 73 (D.D.C. 2005) (same).
197. See Kiyemba 1!, 561 F.3d at 512-13. Section 7 of the MCA amended the federal habeas
statute to preclude not only habeas corpus petitions by Guantdnamo detainees, MCA § 7(a), 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (e)(1) (2006), but also "any other action against the United States ...relating to any
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement" of a detained alien
determined to be an enemy combatant. MCA § 7(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). Boumediene did not
clearly invalidate all of section 7 of the MCA, leaving open the argument that the Court struck down
only section 7(a). See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __,128 S.Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008) ("MCA § 7
thus effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. In view of our holding we need not discuss
the reach of the writ with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement.")
(emphasis added). District courts within the District of Columbia held, prior to Kiyemba II, that
Boumediene's failure to invalidate MCA section 7(b) meant that detainees could not challenge the
conditions of their confinement at Guantdnamo. See, e.g., AI-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.Supp.2d I11,
117-19 (D.D.C. 2009); Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236 (D.D.C. 2008); In re GuantAnamo
Bay Detainee Utig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Guantinamo Bay Detainee
Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17-19 (D.D.C. 2008). However, after Kiyemba 11,it is clear that the
MCA does not pose an obstacle to a conditions-of-confinement claim: detainees can challenge
abusive treatment or lack of medical care through the vehicle of habeas. How, exactly, the expanded
habeas jurisdiction of Kiyemba II can be squared with the declaration in Kiyemba I that Guantdnamo
detainees lack all due process rights, see infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text, remains to be
seen.
198. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 514.

Muscular Procedure
broad standards of deference to the Executive in matters of foreign
affairs prevented the possibility of any judicial oversight, even where
detainees challenged the underlying quality of the Executive's process
for ensuring the safe treatment of repatriated detainees. Unless the
Supreme Court intervenes, Kiyemba II prevents detainees from using
litigation to halt transfers where, owing
to conditions overseas, the best
1 99
practice is to remain at Guantdnamo

199. The rationale of Kiyemba 1I is based largely upon the Supreme Court's decision in Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), decided the same day as Boumediene. In Munaf, two
U.S. citizens who committed crimes in Iraq after 9/11 brought habeas corpus petitions challenging
their transfer from U.S. to Iraqi custody for prosecution before an Iraqi court. 128 S. Ct. at 2214-16.
(One of the two petitioners, Muhammed Munaf, was tried and sentenced to death by an Iraqi court
for helping organize a kidnapping, but his conviction was overturned by the Iraqi Court of Cassation
in February 2009. Id. at 2215.) A unanimous Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens located off U.S.
shores could invoke the writ but denied the petition on the merits. Id. at 2213. Although one of the
petitioners claimed that his transfer "to Iraqi custody [was] likely to result in torture," the Court held
that this "matter of serious concern" needed to "be addressed by the political branches, not the
judiciary." Id. at 2225. However, the Court noted distinct procedural safeguards inspiring greater
confidence in the overseas tribunal. Unlike Kiyemba 11, Munaf was situated within a criminal-law
context in which the Court was satisfied with the procedural safeguards of the foreign tribunal.
Habeas relief "would interfere with Iraq's sovereign right to 'punish offenses against its laws
committed within its borders,"' Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Wilson v. Girard,354 U.S. 524,
529 (1957)), and the Court cautioned against the invocation of the writ as "a means of compelling
the United States to harbor fugitives from the criminal justice system of a sovereign with undoubted
authority to prosecute them," id. at 2223. Moreover, the petitioners were held by U.S. forces, "an
integral part of the Iraqi system of criminal justice," as they awaited trial by the Iraqi criminal
courts. Id. at 2214-15, 2223-24. Justice Souter's concurrence also noted that the petitioners
voluntarily traveled to Iraq, a U.S. ally, which was prosecuting them for crimes committed on its
soil; the prison and detention facilities in which the men would be held were determined by the U.S.
State Department to have generally met internationally accepted standards for basic prisoner needs;
and, on the specific topic of torture, the case left open the possibility of a different outcome "in
which the probability of torture is well documented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it."
Id. at 2228 (Souter, J., concurring). Kiyemba II, by contrast, did not present the same safeguards
noted by the Court in Munaf: the petitioners were not accused of wrongdoing and were deemed by
the U.S. government to be at risk of torture upon return to their home country. See Kiyemba H, 561
F.3d at 519 n.5 ("[T]he United States will not send these Uighur detainees back to their home
country of China, apparently because the Executive has concluded there is a likelihood of torture by
China."). Unlike Kiyemba II, Munaf is an illustration of muscular procedure that affirms an
executive branch determination, as opposed to the many cases discussed previously that reject an
executive determination through muscular procedural review. See also infra note 238 (discussing
Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950), as a decision employing muscular procedure to affirm
an executive branch decision).
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Muscular Procedureand BilateralEndorsement

The unique post-9/11 context also raises questions about the
descriptive accuracy and normative attractiveness of a pure, unalloyed
bilateral endorsement approach. Boumediene "declared unconstitutional
a law enacted by Congress and signed by the president on an issue of
military policy in a time of armed conflict,, 200 which would have passed
muster under the bilateral endorsement approach. Moreover, Hamdi
placed restrictions on the detention of enemy combatants even though
Congress appeared to authorize those detentions through passage of the
AUMF. 211 Hamdi and Boumediene, while leaving open questions about
the scope of executive authority under the AUMF, contradict the
premise that legislative endorsement is always a sufficient basis for
legitimating executive action.
Moreover, the political reality after 9/11 raises questions about the
normative attractiveness of bilateral endorsement, particularly the
reliance its adherents have placed on a "dynamic political process
between legislature and executive ' ' 202 during times when liberty and
security come into conflict. That dynamism has been generally
nonexistent during the past several years,20 3 during which time Congress
has defined itself more by abdication than by oversight of executive
action. 204
In any event, mere agreement between two branches in no way
assures a commitment to the rule of law. As scholars have noted,

200. Cole, supra note 1, at 48.
201. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
202. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 11; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 58, at
1199-2000 ("[I]f the national legislature distrusts the President, it has every reason to legislate

clearly, so as to reduce his room to maneuver. A future Congress, for example, might issue a more
detailed AUMF, one that more carefully described the entities against which force could be used

and the limits under which the President might operate, rather than leaving those issues to a
President it did not trust or to courts that had no expertise in the area. In this respect, our approach

might well revitalize Congress's own role, precisely by encouraging greater specificity."). For a
critique of the Posner and Sunstein position that reorients the discussion around the question of a
sufficient deliberative process within the executive branch, see Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at
1247-48.

203. See supra Part lI.B.3.
204. As Benjamin Wittes observes, "The absence of the national legislature from some of the
most significant policy discussions of our time has brought about deleterious consequences at a
number of levels." BENJAMIN WrITES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE
AGE OF TERROR 10 (2008).

Muscular Procedure
bilateral endorsement "runs the risk of inviting Congress and the
executive to collude in the violation of individual rights. 2 °5 It also may
overlook built-in constraints to the law-making process 20 6 as well as the
incentives for members of Congress to avoid any rigorous oversight role
of the executive branch.0 7 Muscular procedure has provided a critical
check by conditioning judicial deference on an integrity within
coordinate branch decision-making that bilateral endorsement takes on
faith.
Decisions of muscular procedure can also help to stimulate the
dynamic process upon which the bilateral endorsement model is based.
Where the President asserts conclusions based on an incomplete
record 20 8 or evidence lacking minimal indicia of reliability, 2° 9 the
judiciary raises a procedural obligation requiring greater transparency or
deliberation. Similarly, where the government asserts a sphere of control
at the outer reaches of vague authorizing legislation, 210 inadequately
fulfills a mandate under a congressional delegation, 211 or leaves a
legislative void,21 2 muscular procedure reorients coordinate branch
decision-making toward the judiciary's own standard of procedural
regularity. Hamdi, Boumediene, and Bismullah suggest perhaps a firstcut preference for bilateral endorsement, followed by a critical
procedural stopgap when the coordinate branches fail to engage in an
adequately considered and deliberative decision-making process. Courts
continue to "defer[] to decisions of political branches on how to resolve

205. Cleveland, supra note 60, at 1135. Cleveland states that "[ilf both Congress and the
President explicitly embrace a wartime policy that infringes on civil liberties, other than ensuring
that basic procedural requirements are respected, there appears little under Jackson's approach that
courts would do to stop them." Id.; see also Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 166,
at 2348 ("[B]ecause many foreign-policy decisions are made in secret, political accountability will
not be as much of a constraint as in the domestic context."); cf Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2,
at 19 ("The risk of an entire nation, and its elected representatives, succumbing to wartime hysteria
is ever present.").
206. See, e.g., Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at 1255.
207. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena I. Steinzor, The People's Agent: Executive Branch
Secrecy and Accountability in an Age of Terrorism, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 112 (Summer
2006) (noting various agency costs of overseeing the Executive).
208. See supra Part I.A. 1.
209. See supra Part I.A.2; supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part 11B.1.
211. See supra Part II.B.2.
212. See supra Part 11.B.3.
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constitutional issues, so long as those decisions bear the earmarks of
deliberation and care. 213
IV. MUSCULAR PROCEDURE'S DOCTRINAL IMPACT
Muscular procedure is not a cure-all for the vast, intractable problems
that arise within the national security context. However, it is an effective
midway point between deferring wholesale to the coordinate branches
on the one hand and dictating substantive outcomes on the other. It
combines the idea of deference to the coordinate branches with an
examination of the procedures those branches adopt in implementing
policy-spanning both the legislative process and the Executive's
implementation of delegated authority. These procedural demands are
generally consistent with the deference courts must accord the political
branches, while still requiring them to employ a modicum of
transparency or deliberation when implementing a given policy. By
requiring adherence to these procedural standards in contexts where one
might find pure deference, the judiciary articulates a basis for more
muscular judicial review and a normative reinforcement for its
involvement in areas generally committed to the plenary power of one or
both of the political branches.21 4
A.

MuscularProcedure'sNormative Basis

Endorsing muscular procedure need not require the conclusion that
courts are always ill-equipped to decide substantive questions such as
the content of constitutional liberty or the scope of executive power in
times of crisis. However, there are distinct benefits to resolving national
security cases, when possible, through decisions of procedural law.
Procedural decisions allow courts to resolve cases, even in the highly
contested area of national security, while still claiming to confine
themselves to an area of judicial expertise and legitimacy.
As an initial matter, procedure is generally seen as the province of the
judiciary and an area in which it has a comparative advantage in

213. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules ofInterbranchDialogue,42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1575, 1583 (2001).
214. For general background on the plenary power doctrine, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,Aliens, Territories,and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary

Power Over ForeignAffairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2002).

Muscular Procedure
expertise. 215 As undeniable experts on process, courts can more sensibly
claim to be better qualified and situated to make procedural decisions
than political officials. 216 The judiciary is both uniquely charged with
resolving procedural disputes and responsible for doing so. Certainly, its
failure to resolve pressing procedural questions poses unique harms for
the rule of law.2 17 Procedural decisions are especially valuable in the
national security context because they can resolve complex cases
without dragging the courts into partisan debates over contested issues of
great social consequence, which can be far more contentious, take much
longer to resolve, and expose the judiciary to claims that it is improperly
taking sides in political matters.
Procedural decisions have instrumental value as well. They avoid the
risk of placing a judicial imprimatur on more heavily freighted, and
fractious, questions of policy. The strong norms of judicial deference
that apply within the national security context can cause confusion; a
court's decision to uphold executive action on substantive grounds could
be taken as signaling deep normative endorsement, even when a decision
merely applies standard doctrinal deference norms. Procedural decisions
can avoid these types of unintentional legitimizing effects, instead
placing "conditions on the effectual exercise of legislative ' '218 and
executive power without dictating the positive terms of any particular
legislative initiative. The decisions focus on the means of coordinate
branch decision-making, allowing the political branches to design the
ends, provided they do so with a transparency expected by any
legitimately constituted body, whether political or judicial.
Muscular procedural decisions, while not strictly constitutional in
nature, "draw[] their inspiration and authority from... various
constitutional provisions" 21 9 and find their justification in a form of legal
process that has developed over the course of the past half-century. More
215. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-12, at 711 (2d ed.
1988) (noting Supreme Court decisions that "rest[] on a notion of the special relevance of judicial
expertise, and the comparative irrelevance of legislative competence, in making process-oriented
decisions").
216. For the classic articulation of this view, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102-04 (1980).

217. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 225 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(noting the "lasting stains on a system of justice" wrought by procedural defects).
218. Hart & Sacks, supra note 18, at 1376.
219. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3
(1975).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 84:661, 2009

than fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington identified
aspects of that process when they observed:
Congress cannot normally be expected also to be aware that
some of the means chosen to achieve immediate ends impinge in
not easily apparent fashion on values of permanent significance.
Were this not so the Constitution, which embodies such values
(and not least among them principles of the recognition of
institutional capabilities), could be left to the care of Congress
alone. But the Supreme Court also guards it and draws from it
what is enduring. We contend that, by the same token, other
values not enshrined in the Constitution but existing in its
penumbra and akin to constitutional ones (and like them not to
be judged in terms of the choice of temporal policies that is for
Congress alone to make) are also entrusted to the guardianship
of the Court. They are no doubt somewhat lower on the scale of
timeless importance and the Court therefore does not have the
power to decree without recourse that they must be vindicated at
all costs or even to define their content with finality. But it is for
the Court to bring them to the fore so that they may receive their
due weight
in Congress as they are otherwise most unlikely to
0
do.

22

By emphasizing the importance of transparency and deliberation
within coordinate branch decision-making, muscular procedure
reinforces a judicial process that "serve[s] to implement constitutional
demands" without undermining "a role for the political branches in
specifying the shape that these requirements take., 22 1 This procedural
review avoids "closing off any policy options for either the executive
branch or the legislature in the short term., 222 Yet it has prohibited either
branch from shrouding decision-making within unnecessary and
inappropriate levels of opacity in ways that would detract from a more
enduring judicial commitment to clear and intelligible process.

220. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1957).
221. Metzger, supra note 129, at 71.
222. Wittes, supra note 204, at 104.

Muscular Procedure
B.

Identifying Muscular ProcedureBeyond National Security-The
Immigration Context

The marshalling of procedure by courts as a response to inadequate
deliberation by a co-equal branch has relevance not only within national
security cases, but in the plenary power context more generally.
Procedural law already has a special function in immigration-related
cases. For example, Hiroshi Motomura has pointed out multiple
decisions in the immigration context in which courts use procedure as a
surrogate for resolving substantive constitutional problemsspecifically, problems of equal protection-that the plenary power
doctrine expressly precludes.223 Although courts generally are unable to
strike down immigration laws entirely on constitutional grounds, they
can use procedural surrogates to channel their commitment to a
constitutional value "by first construing the constitutional challenge as
'procedural,' and then invalidating the decision on procedural due
process grounds. 224 This allows courts to use due process to remedy the
differential treatment of various groups within immigration law, in effect
translating equal protection values through the Due Process Clause's
liberty component. 225 "Because of the anomalous structure that the
plenary power doctrine imposes on constitutional immigration law,"
Motomura explains, "procedural decisions are often the only vehicle for
taking substantive constitutional rights seriously .... ,2 2 6 These
procedural surrogates for constitutional decision-making thus provide a

223. Motomura, supra note 5, at 1659 (arguing that procedural decisions have become a
"surrogate[] for the substantive constitutional claims that the plenary power doctrine would seem to
bar"); id. at 1627-28 (noting how courts "created an important exception to the plenary power
doctrine by hearing constitutional claims sounding in 'procedural due process"'). The judicially
created plenary power doctrine requires courts to defer to legislative and executive decision-making
in immigration-related matters. The doctrine emerged from a sense "that immigration law and
policy touched on the most vital and sensitive concerns of national sovereignty, self-definition, and
self-preservation." Id. at 1648. Examples are legion. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977) (underscoring "the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation");
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 755-60, 769-70 (1972) (holding that the Attorney General's
decision to deny a temporary nonimmigrant visa to a Belgian journalist espousing Marxist views
could not be challenged under the First Amendment); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("[It is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government.").
224. Motomura, supra note 5, at 1628.
225. See id. at 1656-79.
226. Id. at 1631.
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crucial response to the harsh effects of the plenary power doctrine; they
are, nevertheless, an incomplete response, for as Stephen Legomsky
explains, "it is an exception that the Supreme Court has displayed little
consistency in recognizing. ,,227
While procedural due process in immigration is often used as a
mechanism for keeping pace with evolving equal protection norms,
muscular procedural males in immigration decisions place checks on
executive unilateralism by preventing the potential abuse of discretion in
the exercise of the Executive's removal power and detention authority.
The judicial concern in immigration cases, as in the Guantdinamo
context, is the adherence by a co-equal branch to a standard of
transparency and deliberation set by the court.
Decisions such as INS v. St. Cyr 228 and Zadvydas v. Davis229 apply
clear statement principles and constitutional avoidance canons,
respectively, to place a check upon the Executive's potential (or actual)
mishandling of detention and removal policy. Rather than signal a
commitment to equal protection, the cases reject executive branch
interpretations of statutes that would consolidate power exclusively
within one branch.
St. Cyr applied the clear statement requirement to retain statutory
habeas jurisdiction under the general federal habeas provision, even
though explicit language in the Immigration and Nationality Act
appeared to strip habeas review for certain types of immigration cases
uniformly throughout all federal law. 230 The Court's jurisdictional
holding rejected an interpretation that would have denied a broad class
of immigration petitioners any review mechanism-an interpretation the
Court refused to credit without a crystal clear statement of congressional

227. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principleof PlenaryCongressionalPower,
1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255, 298.
228. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
229. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
230. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-314 (holding that various provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996-both of which contained comprehensive amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act-did not strip federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2241). Upon finding habeas jurisdiction, the Court held that a form of relief from removal
that existed prior to the 1996 immigration reforms remained available to individuals who, like St.
Cyr, were eligible for such relief at the time they pled guilty to certain crimes but were placed in
removal proceedings after that form of relief was repealed. Id. at 326.

Muscular Procedure
intent, 23 even in matters of immigration, where judicial deference runs
high. Removing one branch (the judicial branch) entirely from having
any input into the availability of relief from crime-related removal orders
raised the possibility that no other body would step in to cure mistakesincluding procedural
error-in the agency's implementation of
232
deportation policy.
Zadvydas invoked procedural concerns as well to reject the executive
branch's position that it enjoyed unlimited detention authority over
removable aliens. The Court limited the executive detention power to "a
period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the
United States, 233 which it held to be six months "in light of the
Constitution's demands. 2 34 The Court avoided any express
interpretation of the Constitution, pointing out instead that the
presumptive six-month limit was predicated on the notion that "[t]he
Constitution may well preclude granting an administrative body
unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental
rights. 235
While procedural surrogates in immigration filter a judicial
commitment to equal protection through a procedural lens, muscular
procedure conveys a concern about political branch abdication and the
broader balance of power among the three branches. As in the
Guantdnamo context, judicial review increases when the coordinate
branches create a vacuum of insufficient adherence to baseline
procedural standards, which muscular procedure abhors. The more that
executive action deviates from a rational implementation of a delegation
or detracts from a plausible interpretation of even a vague congressional
statute, the more the judiciary responds with muscular procedural
review.

231. Id. at 312-13 (finding an absence of any provision that "speaks with sufficient clarity to bar
jurisdiction pursuant to the general habeas statute").
232. See, e.g., id. at 305 ("[A] serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if we were to
accept the INS' submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges
and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise ....
233. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Muscular Procedure'sEffect in Future Cases

Whether the judiciary continues to issue decisions of muscular
procedure will likely depend upon the deliberation the coordinate
branches bring to future security-related decisions. The testing ground
may emerge in a case the Supreme Court will consider in its current
Term involving the repatriation of detainees whom the government has
determined pose no threat to the United States, or possibly in another
case in which detainees are seeking to block their return to countries
where they fear torture. On the former question, the D.C. Circuit ruled in
Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba J)236 that detainees still stationed at
Guantdinamo, including those ordered released by habeas courts, have no
due process rights and that, accordingly, district courts may not order
their release into the United States.237 Kiyemba I places into doubt
federal court authority to review the prolonged detention of individuals
who have been cleared for release but cannot be relocated safely to a
third country. The case provides occasion for the Supreme Court to
clarify aspects of Rasul and Boumediene that appear to repudiate
decisions upon which the Kiyemba I court relied-in particular, cases
barring non-citizens from redressing action by U.S. officials outside the
territorial United States.238 More deeply, the case raises questions about
236. 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted,77 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2009) (No.
08-1234).
237. Id. at 1026.
238. Kiyemba I relied heavily on pre-Boumediene decisions drawing a sharp distinction between
the protections available to aliens located inside the United States and the lack of such protections
for similarly situated aliens located outside the United States. See id. at 1026 ("Decisions of the
Supreme Court and of this court ... hold that the due process clause does not apply to aliens
without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States.") (citing, inter alia,
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)). Verdugo-Urquidez, which involved
the extraterritoriality of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures to a non-U.S. citizen, required that a non-citizen have a "previous significant voluntary
connection with the United States" to invoke constitutional rights. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
271. The logic of Verdugo-Urquidez was based on an expansive interpretation of Johnson v.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950), in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to twenty-one German nationals who were captured in
China by U.S. forces and convicted before an American military commission in Nanking.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 766. The EisentragerCourt held that non-U.S. citizens captured outside
U.S. territory and tried before a military tribunal on foreign soil could not bring writs of habeas
corpus in U.S. courts to challenge their convictions. Id. at 785. But there are important factual
differences between cases such as Eisentragerand Verdugo-Urquidez, on which Kiyemba I relied,
and the circumstances surrounding Guant~namo noted in Boumediene, which Kiyemba I generally
overlooked. For instance, Boumediene recognized that the Eisentragerpetitioners were afforded a

Muscular Procedure
the government's overall accountability in resolving the crisis
surrounding those detained individuals who remain virtually stateless at
this time, especially now that President Obama has declared a wish to
close the Guantinamo detention facility. 239 A muscular procedural ruling
in that case would look beyond the D.C. Circuit's purely deferential
stance toward the Executive's repatriation process and consider the
thoroughness of executive branch efforts to repatriate those detainees to
third countries. Such a ruling would condition deference on the
government's demonstration of its own accountability as opposed to
simply assuming that a rigorous process is underway.
Kiyemba II takes an equally categorical position on the ability of
federal courts to review executive branch decisions on repatriations. 4°
Yet neither Kiyemba II nor the Supreme Court's Munaf decision 241 upon
which it relies considered a scenario where there was evidence
undermining the government's assurance that detainees would not be
harmed upon return. During oral argument in Kiyemba H, the panel
questioned the government on the quality of those assurances but made
no mention of that issue in its decision categorically deferring to

full adversarial process to challenge their detention, "entitled to representation by counsel, allowed
to introduce evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution's
witnesses." Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. , 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2259-60 (2008). The Guantinamo
detainees, by contrast, were provided with a limited CSRT process that "f[e]ll well short of the
procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review."
Id. at 2260. Boumediene may therefore cabin Verdugo-Urquidez's broad interpretation of
Eisentrager,which "the executive branch has held in its back pocket for many years." Neal K.
Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantdnamo Cases, 2004-2005 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 49, 54-55; see Neuman, supra note 45, at 285 ("The Boumediene opinion makes clear that
lacking presence or property in the United States does not make a foreign national a constitutional
nonperson whose interests deserve no consideration."). The Kiyemba I court's reliance on
arguments Boumediene appears to discredit suggests potential room for reversal by the Supreme
Court when it considers the case later this Term.
The factual distinctions between Boumediene and Eisentrager illustrate ways that Eisentrager,
like Munaf, 553 U.S. _,128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), can be read as a decision of muscular procedure,
for in Eisentrager the Supreme Court upheld executive branch decision-making in light of the
satisfaction of critical procedural safeguards, obviating the need for greater judicial intervention.
See also supra note 199 (discussing Munafas a decision employing muscular procedure to affirm an
executive branch decision).
239. See supra note 132.
240. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I1), 561 F.3d 509, 514.(D.C. Cir. 2009). For a discussion of
Kiyemba 1I, see supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
241. For a discussion of Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), see supra note
199.
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executive expertise on repatriations. 242 The recent Third Circuit decision
in Khouzam v. Attorney General243 took a far more skeptical approach
toward diplomatic assurances by holding that a petitioner who was
denied an opportunity to challenge diplomatic assurances in the context
of removal was denied due process rights. 2 "
Beyond Guantdnamo, one lower court has already extended the
Boumediene decision by interpreting the habeas corpus statute to apply
at the Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.2 45 The decision raises the
prospect that prisoners might have legal rights to challenge their
detention, no matter where in the world they are held, provided the
United States has sufficient control of (and responsibility for) the
detention facility. Significant to the decision was the court's observation
that the process used to determine a detainee's status "at Bagram falls
well short of what the Supreme Court found inadequate at
Guantanamo, '' 246 suggesting, consistent with the decisions discussed
previously, that the government is not entitled to unlimited discretion
when holding individuals captured beyond the battlefield unless it can
demonstrate through some meaningful process that the detainees are
properly held. To the extent that the military is unable to adhere to these
standards, the judiciary could conceivably issue additional decisions of
muscular procedure as a corrective for those insufficiencies.
CONCLUSION
The post-9/1 1 executive detention cases provide occasion to consider
how courts have conditioned deference upon transparency and
deliberation in the crafting and implementation of security-related
policy. By invoking procedural devices in this way, courts have brought
large numbers of cases to effective resolution. Moreover, they have
insisted that the coordinate branches engage in a more thorough and
242. The Kiyemba H panel pressed the government by asking whether it would accept "a holding
that required a showing in each individual case" that the person being transferred would not be
harmed upon return. The government's counsel equivocated on the filing of individualized
determinations, stating, "I don't think that's a worthwhile endeavor," but conceded that "[i]f the
court requires it, we would do that." Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Kiyemba I1,561 F.3d 509
(No. 05-5487).
243. 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008).
244. Id. at 257-59.
245. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009).
246. Id. at 227.

Muscular Procedure
deliberative decision-making process. Courts have required Congress to
oversee executive branch decision-making through clear legislation, and
required the President to reasonably interpret authorizing legislation and
properly implement congressional delegations of power. This muscular
judicial review has generally focused on the means of coordinate branch
decision-making, avoiding substantive policy determinations that are
entrusted to the legislature and executive branches. Thus, while courts
have yielded to the political branches in order to accommodate new
challenges and a perceived emergency, they have required adherence to
a standard of procedural regularity they themselves have set. In doing so,
courts have reinforced their critical role in the broader tripartite
framework, even within the highly freighted context of national security,
by grounding decision-making within their own area of expertise.
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